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 INTRODUCTION 
Though Congress enacted § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
19341 both to compensate defrauded investors and to deter fraudulent uses 
of the securities markets,2 many commentators have argued that the Act is 
justified only to the extent that it serves the latter function.  The 
transactions costs involved in litigation render courts notoriously inefficient 
in compensating injured parties,3 and because diversified investors should 
benefit from manipulated stock prices as often as they are harmed by them, 
court-ordered relief is arguably unnecessary in the first instance.  
Moreover, because the corporate entity and its shareholders, not the 
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 1. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006) (“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 
indirectly . . . to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . 
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986) (reflecting a decision 
that was also meant to “ensure full disclosure of information,” a deterrence-related goal).  
The SEC enacted Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007), to implement 10b-5.  History 
surrounding the adoption of Rule 10b-5 is rather scant.  The SEC drafted the rule after its 
lawyers learned that the president of a Boston company was issuing pessimistic statements 
about his company’s earnings to purchase its stock on the cheap.  Milton V. Freeman, 
Administrative Procedures, 22 BUS. LAW. 891, 922 (1967).  Although the Securities Act of 
1933 prohibited fraudulent sales of securities, the SEC lacked a regulatory means to 
prosecute fraudulent purchases.  To remove this “loophole,” Employment of Manipulative 
and Deceptive Devices, Exchange Act Release No. 3230, 7 Fed. Reg. 3804 (May 21, 
1942), available at 1942 WL 34443, the SEC passed Rule 10b-5 under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 with no discussion save for Commissioner Sumner Pike’s question, 
“Well, we are against fraud, aren’t we?”  Freeman, supra, at 922. 
 3. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 281 
(2004) (concluding the administrative costs of settled and litigated claims approach or 
exceed the amounts that victims receive). 
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culpable individuals, generally absorb the vast majority of costs associated 
with suits, verdicts, and settlements, securities litigation produces more 
redistribution than restitution:  shareholders who happen to avoid losses 
from manipulated stock prices subsidize those who are less fortunate.4 
The deterrence rationale, however, is not so easily dismissed.  Though 
securities fraud may not directly harm investors, it creates undesirable 
systemic effects in the form of externalities.  Price manipulation, for 
example, has clear, detrimental effects on the ways in which securities 
markets allocate capital.  And prominent, Enron-like instances of fraud 
may reduce investors’ confidence in the market5 and damage the efficiency 
of incentive structures that often govern takeovers and executive 
compensation.6  The desirability of the current system of securities 
regulation thus depends on whether the incremental deterrent of § 10(b)’s 
private right of action exceeds the costs of such litigation on businesses, 
which include not only losses associated with defending against and 
settling frivolous litigation, but also the disruption of normal business 
practices. 
Economic theory provides a starting point in determining whether the 
deterrent effect of litigation is sufficient to render private enforcement of § 
10(b) desirable.  Theoretically, the optimal penalty for a disfavored activity 
should equal the social harm of that behavior discounted by its probability 
of detection.7  When penalties—broadly conceived to include civil 
 4. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in 
Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 639 (1985) (describing the problem of “matched 
gains and losses,” in which “[s]ome investors gain, others lose, and the gains and losses are 
approximately equal”).  It is important to note, however, these reforms are not necessarily 
desirable with respect to 1933 Act litigation; in the context of IPOs, the “winner” from an 
artificially enhanced stock price is the corporation itself rather than innocent shareholders. 
 5. But see Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient:  An Economic 
Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 637 
(1988) (proposing that stock prices play less of a role in allocating capital than commonly 
believed); Lawrence H. Summers, Does the Stock Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental 
Values?, 41 J. FIN. 591, 592 (1986) (questioning theoretical and empirical underpinnings of 
the Efficient Markets Hypothesis). 
 6. Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action:  An Essay on 
Deterrence and its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1565-66 (2006) (discussing 
misallocation of capital).  Some scholars also argue that securities litigation itself creates 
positive externalities when it acts “as an ex-post mechanism to discipline managers of 
companies with relatively weak ex-ante corporate governance control.”  Stephen J. Choi, 
The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1484 (2004).  
Other scholars, however, contend that enhancing shareholder rights so that shareholders 
themselves act as a greater check on management can achieve the same effect.  See, e.g., 
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784, 1784-85 
(2006) (advocating providing shareholders with power to initiate “rules-of-the-game 
decisions”). 
 7. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:  An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. 
ECON. 169 (1968) (applying an economic analysis example to determine optimal resource 
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damages, criminal sanctions, and various other negative repercussions—are 
calibrated to reach this value, rational actors will lack incentives to engage 
in the disfavored activity and will efficaciously “internalize the costs as 
well as the benefits of their actions.”8  Overly lenient penalties result in 
excessive securities fraud, while excessive penalties will over-deter, 
perhaps discouraging socially-beneficial activity like the disclosure of 
business-related information. 
A number of recent cases and reforms reflect an attempt to tweak the 
variables in this equation to create a more efficient system of securities 
regulation—to produce an optimal penalty by decreasing the size of awards 
or the ease with which private litigants may prosecute (or “detect”) 10b-5 
claims.  One example is Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc.,9 in which the Court held that Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola 
were not secondarily liable for misrepresentations that Charter made to its 
investors.10  In effectively eliminating scheme liability,11 Stoneridge can be 
seen as reducing the expected “penalty” for securities fraud by shaping the 
doctrine to limit the prosecution, or detection, of securities fraud.  Tellabs, 
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,12 which held that competing inferences 
must be taken into account when determining whether the plaintiff has 
adequately pled scienter, functions similarly.13  By raising the pleading 
standards, the Court risked leaving some additional amount of securities 
fraud unpunished (and therefore “undetected”).14  
allocation in crime prevention); Coffee, supra note 6, at 1565–66 (noting the difficulties in 
determining social harm). 
 8. Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1493 (1996).  Section 28(a) of the Exchange Act prohibits punitive 
damages.  See Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 302 (2d Cir. 1968) (“[P]unitive damages 
may not be recovered in actions under Rule 10b-5 and § 10(b) of the 1934 Act because 
§ 28(a) of that act limits recovery in private suits for damages to ‘actual damages.’” 
(citation omitted)).  Thus, compensatory damages alone must satisfy this requirement to 
produce an optimal penalty.  This task seems impossible, as compensatory damages are not 
adjusted to reflect the probability of detection and are necessarily smaller than net social 
loss because they do not account for externalities.  But such an argument would also 
presume that investor losses proxy damages, which is inaccurate.  See infra Part I.A 
(demonstrating that damages generally are larger than investor losses). 
 9. 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008). 
 10. Id. at 769. 
 11. Whether Stoneridge actually ended the scheme liability debate is questionable.  
Instead of extending the categorical rejection of aiding and abetting liability under Rule 
10b-5 found in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 
(1994), the Stoneridge Court rejected liability on the basis that the plaintiff investors’ 
reliance on Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola’s actions was “too remote.”  128 S. Ct. at 769.  
This “remoteness” question is one of fact, and a number of similar cases consequently might 
make their way to juries, forcing potentially coercive settlements. 
 12. 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007). 
 13. Id. at 2505. 
 14. Given that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) stays discovery 
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Another approach can be seen in § 21D(e) of the PSLRA, which caps 
per-share damages at the average trading price during the “ninety-day 
period beginning on the date on which the information correcting the 
misstatement or omission that is the basis for the action is disseminated to 
the market.”15  This provision, which aims to prevent “excessive” 
recoveries in situations where stock prices overreact to the disclosure of 
fraud, reduces the size of damages in any given suit, and thereby decreases 
the expected penalty for engaging in securities fraud. 
These approaches are, however, fundamentally inadequate in that they 
use a measure of damages (losses to shareholders from stock drops) 
unrelated to the actual social harm of securities fraud (capital 
misallocation).  This process is flawed to the extent that courts are playing 
with variables that defy quantification and comparison.  Though they wax 
poetic about the vexatious nature of class actions,16 courts and 
policymakers have little empirical basis to conclude, for example, that 
securities class actions over-deter when they include secondarily-involved 
entities as defendants or are filed without strong and detailed scienter 
allegations. 
Given these difficulties, this Comment attempts to use market 
mechanisms to gain better insight into the design of optimal legal 
structures.  To proceed in this direction, it views securities litigation in 
terms of contract, that is, by asking what shareholders might agree to ex 
ante with respect to securities fraud.  Shareholders should have the best 
incentives to minimize net social losses from such fraud, as they experience 
harm from both the inefficiencies that flow from capital misallocation and 
the detrimental effects of over-deterrence on business.  In the end, this 
approach is similarly indeterminate because shareholders, like courts, 
while a motion to dismiss is pending, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 
U.S.C. 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2000), plaintiffs may be unable to uncover evidence of securities 
fraud in cases where they otherwise would have been able to do so.  Congressional debates 
over the PSLRA not surprisingly characterized the legislation as a means to reduce 
frivolous lawsuits.  See Choi, supra note 6, at 1477–99 (surveying academic studies that 
demonstrate the difficulty in measuring whether a lawsuit is frivolous or meritorious); 
Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995:  Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, Defendants 
and Lawyers, 51 BUS. LAW. 1009, 1018-27 (1996) (discussing legislative history of the 
PSLRA). 
 15. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e) (2006). 
 16. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 86 
(2006) (describing the special risk of “vexatious litigation” inherent in 10b-5 class actions); 
see also Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 189 (discussing the “ripple effects” of such 
litigation); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478-79 (1977) (adding further that 
federal securities laws could interfere with state corporate law); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975) (“There has been widespread recognition that 
litigation under Rule 10b-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in 
kind from that which accompanies litigation in general.”). 
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cannot determine accurately the magnitude of relevant externalities, but it 
nevertheless provides an alternate framework to evaluate the current 
scheme of privately (and publicly) enforcing § 10(b).  Ironically, this 
approach suggests that, while securities class actions are intended to protect 
investors, shareholders would likely outlaw their use were they able to 
collaborate ex ante. 
The remainder of this Comment proceeds as follows.  Part I discusses 
shareholders’ incentives to bring suit for violations of Rule 10b-5.  Under 
an approach that does not consider the negative externalities caused by 
securities fraud, shareholders would be better off if they agreed not to file 
securities class actions.  Such cooperation, however, will never materialize 
because of hold-out problems, and the resulting scenario thus parallels the 
basic prisoners’ dilemma.  Part II reintroduces the consideration of 
deterrence, and concludes that, despite the presence of serious externalities 
to securities fraud, current doctrine may very well be undesirably harsh and 
result in over-deterrence.  Part III examines current judicial reactions to the 
shortcomings of securities litigation and presents proposals for reform.  
These proposals are informed by the inefficiency that shareholder 
coordination problems produce and attempt to generate law that facilitates 
the optimal level of enforcement.  In particular, Part III argues that 
policymakers should replace Rule 10b-5’s private right of action with a 
more vigorous public enforcement regime, or facilitate shareholder pre-
commitment strategies.  Part IV briefly concludes. 
I.  SHAREHOLDERS’ INCENTIVES TO SUE 
This Part examines diversified shareholders’ incentives to bring 
securities class actions to address violations of the 1934 Act.  It assumes 
that shareholders are self-interested and rational,17 and does not consider 
the negative externalities on capital allocation and incentive mechanisms 
associated with securities fraud.  Although the latter assumption renders the 
discussion incomplete, it is not unrealistic in that individual shareholders 
are myopic and unable to account for externalities in their decision-
making.18 
 17. But see Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation?  Some Behavioral 
Observations Regarding Proposals for Its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397, 1432 (2002) 
(criticizing rational actor models as applied to institutional investors); Stephen J. Choi & 
Adam C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC 7–13 (Univ. of Cal., Berkeley Sch. 
of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 115, 2003), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=500203 (discussing various investor biases that cause irrational 
behavior, such as availability bias, hindsight bias, and the endowment effect). 
 18. See generally SANJAI BHAGAT & RICHARD H. JEFFERIS, JR., THE ECONOMETRICS OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STUDIES 24 (2005) (comparing the greater influence and 
information access of large shareholders to the passivity and myopia of small shareholders). 
  
480 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 11:2 
 
 
Acting individually, shareholders have overwhelming incentives to 
file suit in response to stock drops; even if diversification makes their 
recovery undesirable in the long run, shareholders rationally will want to 
recover as much as possible in the short term.  But while shareholders’ 
individual incentives favor suit in all circumstances, their collective 
interests may differ.  This Part analyzes these divergences, which inform a 
quasi-contractual analysis of shareholder litigation—that is, an analysis of 
how shareholders would craft § 10(b) enforcement if they were able to 
negotiate collectively ex ante.  Subpart A shows that, because stock price 
manipulation should benefit such investors as often as it harms them, the 
private right of action under § 10(b) lacks a compensatory rationale.19  
Subpart B then asks whether shareholders would still bring securities class 
actions if they were able to contract as a group.  It concludes that investors 
are subject to a classic prisoners’ dilemma:  externalities excluded, 
shareholders would be better off if they contracted to prohibit Rule 10b-5 
suits, but such an outcome will never emerge because of coordination 
problems and hold-outs in particular. 
A.  Compensatory Rationales for Shareholder Litigation 
Unlike traditional torts such as battery or intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, securities fraud does not by itself produce direct social 
harm.20  Every transaction that damages an investor as a result of a 
misrepresentation or omission will produce a windfall of equal value to the 
opposing party in the transaction.21  Consequently, and as many scholars 
have noted, individual and net social harms that exclude externalities 
approximate zero.22  Victims of securities fraud, unlike traditional tort 
 19.   At best, then, § 10(b) operates to create private attorneys general to enforce the 
securities laws, although the damages it generates are generally much larger than penalties 
imposed by similar schemes.  See Cornerstone Research, 2007:  A Year in Review 14–15 
(2008), available at http://securities.cornerstone.com/pdfs/YIR2007.pdf (comparing the 
size and prevalence of settlements and verdicts across securities class actions). 
 20. A number of courts have noted the dissimilarities between securities fraud and the 
early torts from which its elements derive.  See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 744–45 
(“[T]he typical fact situation in which the classic tort of misrepresentation and deceit 
evolved was light years away from the world of commercial transactions to which Rule 
10b-5 is applicable . . . .  In today’s universe of transactions governed by the 1934 Act, 
privity of dealing or even personal contact between potential defendant and potential 
plaintiff is the exception and not the rule.”). 
 21. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 639–40. 
 22. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 6, at 1535–36 (“All this rhetoric, however, misses the 
fundamental problem:  As presently constituted, securities class actions produce wealth 
transfers among shareholders that neither compensate nor deter.”); see also Alexander, 
supra note 8, at 1496 (“The net social cost, as measured solely by trading gains and losses, 
arguably is zero.”). 
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plaintiffs, can protect themselves if they diversify their investments such 
that they are as likely to receive a windfall as a loss.23  In the long-run, a 
fully-diversified investor should benefit if he or she purchases at a normal 
price and then sells at an inflated price as often as he or she is damaged by 
engaging in the opposite transaction. 
Moreover, because “individual defendants almost never contribute 
personally to settlements,”24 securities litigation amounts to an expensive 
redistribution of wealth among innocent shareholders.  Judge Henry 
Friendly recognized this problem in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.25 when 
he noted that expansive 10b-5 liability can “lead to large judgments, 
payable in the last analysis by innocent investors, for the benefit of 
speculators and their lawyers.”26  The court in In re California Micro 
Devices Securities Litigation27 concluded similarly when it rejected a 
proposed settlement that would have compensated putative class members 
by issuing new shares.  Quoting a letter from Professor Joseph Grundfest, 
Judge Walker noted that the agreement would “dilute the equity interests” 
of current shareholders by a percentage equal to that awarded to the 
plaintiffs.28  Accordingly, “with respect to such shareholders the proposed 
settlement [would] charge [an attorney’s] fee of 20.5 percent for shifting 
economic value from one pocket to the other.”29  Regardless of whether a 
settlement awards shares or money damages, the same deficiency is present 
in each instance:  shareholders end up footing the bill. 
This circular, redistributive function both weakens the deterrent effect 
of securities litigation30 and also creates a system that resembles an 
inefficient form of investors’ insurance.31  While the costs of 
 23. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 8, at 1502 (“An investor who is completely 
diversified will be fully compensated for its trading losses that are due to securities fraud 
by windfalls on other transactions.  Such investors have no need for further compensation 
obtained through litigation.”). 
 24. Id. at 1499; see Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside 
Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (2006) (discussing the frequency with which 
courts tend to hold outside directors liable in securities litigation). 
 25. 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 26. Id. 
 27. 168 F.R.D. 257 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
 28. Id. at 271. 
 29. Id.; see Alexander, supra note 8, at 1504–05 (noting that shareholders in California 
Micro Devices objected to the settlement because it did not require officers or directors to 
contribute); cf. G. Chin Chao, Securities Class Actions and Due Process, 1996 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 547, 548–49 (1996) (discussing several instances in which courts have 
rejected class settlements). 
 30. See infra Part I.B (discussing shareholder coordination problems). 
 31. The Court has noted frequently that the purpose of 10b-5 is “not to provide 
investors with broad insurance against market losses, but to protect them against those 
economic losses that misrepresentations actually cause.”  Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 
544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005); see also Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 252 (1988) (White, J., 
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diversification are relatively low, if existent, the transactions costs required 
to compensate “damaged” investors through the legal system are quite 
high.  Professor Richard Booth, for example, estimates that the 
“deadweight loss” from “attorney fees and other expenses . . . average[s] 
about 20 percent of awards.”32  But this number is likely to dramatically 
underestimate actual costs.  Transactions costs include not only law firms’ 
increasing fee requests (the plaintiffs’ lawyers in the Enron litigation 
recently requested $688 million in fees)33 and the disruption that securities 
litigation creates for businesses,34 but also the tax dollars that the legal 
system requires to operate and the costs associated with the delivery of 
awards.35  Professor Steven Shavell estimates that “administrative costs, 
averaged over settled and litigated claims, approach or exceed the amounts 
received by victims.  That is, for every dollar received by a victim, a dollar 
or more is spent delivering the dollar to him.”36  Rule 10b-5 class actions 
are unlikely to be an excepti
dissenting) (arguing that Rule 10b-5 should not be an insurance policy for investors); AUSA 
Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202, 234 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The securities laws are, 
of course, not an insurance policy against all losses by investors . . . .”); Chemical Bank v. 
Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 943 (2d Cir. 1984) (asserting that Rule 10b-5 aims 
to ensure that buyers actually receive what they believe they are buying, and to prevent 
buyer deception from short-changing sellers); Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 
534, 549 (5th Cir. 1981) (insisting that, without a requirement to show causation, Rule 10b-
5 would simply insure shares bought in reliance upon material misrepresentations).  
However, the court’s logic is questionable when considering that securities fraud does not 
damage diversified investors.  Although doctrines like causation and reliance limit the 
number of instances that may activate 10b-5’s compensatory function, the doctrine 
inherently acts as an insurer against short-term losses in situations where it applies. 
 32. Richard A. Booth, Taking Certification Seriously—Why There Is No Such Thing as 
an Adequate Representative in a Securities Fraud Class Action (Villanova Law Pub. Law 
& Legal Theory, Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2008-07, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1026768. 
 33. See Kristen Hays, Fees for Law Firm Debated, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 1, 2008, at 3 
(reporting the $336 million fee award in the WorldCom case). 
 34. See Marilyn F. Johnson, Karen K. Nelson & A.C. Pritchard, In re Silicon Graphics 
Inc.:  Shareholder Wealth Effects Resulting from the Interpretation of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act’s Pleading Standard, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 773, 783 (2000) (“Beyond 
the cost in executives’ time, the mere existence of the class action may disrupt relationships 
with suppliers and customers, who may be somewhat leery of dealing with a party accused 
of fraud.  The Supreme Court has recognized that securities fraud suits pose ‘the threat of 
extensive discovery and disruption of normal business activities.’”) (quoting Blue Chip 
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 742–43 (1975))). 
 35. Indeed, Professor Alexander predicts that, in some cases, as much as half of the 
value of a settlement may “drop[] on the floor for lawyers to pick up.”  Alexander, supra 
note 8, at 1503. 
 36. SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 281. 
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B.  Shareholder Coordination Problems 
If securities class actions are simply a form of redistribution with 
transactions costs conceivably as high as 50%,37 then why are Americans 
so litigious?  Given that diversified, repeat investors will gain from 
securities litigation only as often as they lose, why do such investors still
 suits? 
In California Micro Devices, the Northern District of California 
rejected a proposed settlement that would have issued equity interests to the 
plaintiff class, noting that “at some point a settlement . . . will become a net 
loss for equity class members, even if they participate fully in [it], since a 
considerable portion of the settlement proceeds will be paid to class 
counsel, to say nothing of the fees paid to defense counsel.”38  In other 
words, class members who still held equity in the defendant corporation 
actually might have lost from settlements, if the proportionate costs of the 
settlement or verdict to the corporation—which includes monies paid to the 
plaintiff class, attorney’s fees, and other costs that stem from the disruptive 
effect of litigation on business practices—diluted the value of their equity 
interests in the corporation.  Although California Micro Devices specified 
the aforementioned argument to equity-holding class members only, the 
argument easily extrapolates to shareholders as a whole.  Accounting for 
diversification has the same effect as assuming that every shareholder holds 
equity in the affected corporation; diversification, by definition, makes 
shareholders as likely to “pay” a settlement as they are to benefit from it.  
In a letter submitted on behalf of Bank of America and Wells Fargo—two 
class members that opposed the settlement in California Micro Devices—
Professor Grundfest explained this effect
 supported a sub-optimal settlement: 
While a member of the class may today benefit from a 
settlement, the same investor may tomorrow find herself diluted 
in another lawsuit when she is not a member of the plaintiff class.  
In the aggregate, shareholders might rationally prefer to reject all 
such settlements, and thereby save the attorneys’ fees generated 
by the transfer of assets from one pocket to another.  However, 
once such a settlement is offered, the only rational shareholder 
response may be to accept the proposed settlement because 
shareholders facing an opportunity to collect a real and present 
settlement cannot bind shareholders facing analogous settlements 
in cases yet to be filed to reject those proposed settlements.  The 
settlement proposal facing shareholders in this proceeding may 
 37. See id. (arguing that administrative costs threaten to consume victims’ damages 
awards). 
 38. In re California Micro Devices Sec. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 257, 272 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
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thus create a form of “prisoners dilemma” in which the rational 
non-cooperative response is to accept the settlement, whereas the 
individuall
reject it.39 
Professor Grundfest’s articulation of the prisoners’ dilemma offers 
one explanation for the frequency of securities litigation.  Even if it is in 
both parties’ best interests not to sue, each party’s dom
mize its own short-term recovery through a suit.40 
A brief example helps explain the workings of this dilemma in a more 
generalized context.41  Assume that a group of investors, A, owns all of 
company X’s stock, 100 shares overall.  At point 1, assume that X releases 
fraudulent earnings estimates that cause its stock price to double from $10 
a share to $20 a share.  At point 2, A sells 10 shares to B, another group of 
investors, at this inflated price.  At point 3, X releases a corrective 
 39. Id. at 271 (emphasis in original). 
 40. Judge Easterbrook provides the following classic explanation of the prisoners’ 
dilemma: 
Two prisoners, unable to confer with one another, must decide whether to take 
the prosecutor’s offer:  confess, inculpate the other, and serve a year in jail, or 
keep silent and serve five years.  If the prisoners could make a (binding) 
bargain with each other, they would keep silent and both would go free.  But 
they can’t communicate, and each fears that the other will talk.  So both 
confess. 
Page v. United States, 884 F.2d 300, 301 (7th Cir. 1989).  Another example of the 
prisoners’ dilemma uses values to demonstrate how the dilemma leads to non-optimal 
outcomes.  PETER C. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY:  AN 
INTRODUCTION 206–08 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1986).  All two-person prisoners’ 
dilemmas share three defining characteristics: 
(1) [E]ach person has a dominant strategy; (2) if each person uses his dominant 
strategy, then the final outcome is Pareto-inferior, in that both persons can find 
some other outcome that they jointly and unanimously prefer; and (3) that their 
strategies are dominant means that even if the players can communicate 
beforehand and agree to avoid the Pareto-inferior outcome, if they cannot 
somehow make a binding agreement, then each person ultimately will defect 
from it. 
Id. at 207.  Although the previous example may seem stylized, “[t]he prisoners’ dilemma is 
a powerful model of politics, and people have used it to gain further insights into political 
processes, including wars, the formation and maintenance of interest groups as well as their 
failure to form or be maintained, and political participation.”  Id. at 220–21; see also id. at 
221–33 (modeling those contexts as the prisoners’ dilemma).  Courts have used this 
theoretic perspective to shed light on situations that range from cigarette advertising, see 
Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (involving 
claims that a cigarette manufacturer falsely advertised “light” cigarettes as safer), to tender 
offers; see also Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) 
(involving a corporation that, as a way to deter hostile tender offers, planned to take 
defensive measures that would seriously harm the company if faced with an unfriendly bid). 
 41. See infra app. I (illustrating the prisoners’ dilemma algebraically). 
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e magnitude of the price decline does 
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disclosure that causes the stock price to return to $10 a share.  B has thus 
lost $100, so it agrees to pay an attorney a 30% conti
The price of X decreases to $9 a share after the market impounds this 
information into the stock price.  Figure 1 reflects these price changes.  The 
price decline from $10 to $9 reflects a pro rata drop in market capitalization 
equal to the value of B’s lawsuit ($100).  Empirical research supports the 
validity of the assumption that stock prices fall in response to securities 
litigation because shareholders end up footing the bill.42  The magnitude of 
the drop, however, is difficult to ascertain and depends on the market’s 
perception of multiple factors, such as the size of the claim, the likelihood 
of its success, costs to the business that must respond to the litigation, and 
attorney’s fees.43  An increase in th
lter the outcome of the game.44 
B has two options:  sue or not sue.  Table 1 shows the payouts to A 
 42. Such a reaction is predictable.  See Alexander, supra note 8, at 1525 (“[A] firm’s 
settlement payment reduces the value of all outstanding shares pro rata.”); Choi, supra note 
6, at 1501 (discussing studies of price declines in response to securities class actions); 
Coffee, supra note 6, at 1537 (“This explanation, that the burden of securities legislation 
falls perversely on the victim, also better explains those stock price event studies that report 
that the subject company’s stock price typically falls when a securities class action is 
filed.”); see also supra Part I.A (discussing the redistributive effects and transactions costs 
that accompany securities litigation). 
 43. See Booth, supra note 32, at 3 (“[T]he prospect of payout by the defendant 
company causes its stock price to fall more than it otherwise would—even in a perfectly 
efficient market—and triggers a positive feedback mechanism that has the effect of 
magnifying the potential payout.”). 
 44. See infra app. I (demonstrating the opposite result—that increasing the magnitude 
of the price drop intensifies the prisoners’ dilemma). 
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 these facts, B obviously will sue, 
as doing so increases his payout by $60. 
 
TABLE 1:  B’S OUTS
and B based on B’s decision.  If B sues, A ends up with 90 shares valued at 
$9 each and worth $810 total, while B gets 10 shares worth $90 total and a 
lawsuit worth $70 ($100 in damages, but with a 30% contingency fee).  If 
B declines to sue, the stock price remains at $10 and the market will not 
discount the price of X’s shares because it does not anticipate a suit.  In 
such a situation, A retains 90 shares worth $10 each, and B has 10 shares 
worth $100 total, but no lawsuit.  Under
PAY  
 A B 
B Sues $810 $160 
B Does not Sue $900 $100 
 
Does accounting for diversification change this result?  Assume that, 
just as A owned the entirety of X and sold shares to B after X 
misrepresented its earnings estimates, B owns the entirety of a second 
company, Y, and does the same to A.  That is, B sells shares of Y to A after 
Y materially misrepresented its earnings to the market.  Assume that, like 
X, Y has 100 outstanding shares worth $10 each, and that Y also 
misrepresents its earnings such that the price of its stock increases to $20.  
B then sells 10 shares to A at this price and, after Y restates its earnings, A 
has the option to file a lawsuit.  Given that this example models perfect 
diversification, the payouts are the same as shown in Table 1, although the 
parties are reversed.  Table 2 reflects the outcome. 
 
TABLE 2:  A’S OUTSPAY  
 A B 
A Sues $160 $810 
A Does not Sue $100 $900 
 
Table 3 displays the result when these two situations are combined, 
that is, when both A and B have the option to sue.  If both parties sue, then 
each will receive the payout of suing ($160) and owning shares of a 
company being sued ($810), for a total of $970.  If one sues but the other 
does not, the suing company will receive $1060 in total.  This payout is 
higher than if both sue.  For instance, if A sued but B did not, then A’s 90 
X shares would remain at $10 per share instead of $9 per share; because B 
is not suing, X’s stock is not affected beyond its return to a non-inflated 
price.  Finally, if neither party sues, each will have $1000.  In that instance, 
A would have 10 shares in Y worth $10 each and 90 shares in X worth $10 
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 have the same total amount with the opposite 
distribution of shares. 
 
TABLE 3: IFIED PA
 
each, while B would
  DIVERS YOUTS 
 B Sues B Does Not Sue 
A Sues (970, 970) (1060, 910) 
A Does Not Sue (910, 1060) (1000, 1000) 
 
Table 3 clearly demonstrates the dilemma.  Although the optimal 
outcome for the two parties is for neither to sue (this produces $2000 of 
value, $30 more than if one of the two parties sued and $60 more than if 
both parties sued), both A and B’s dominant strategy is to sue.  A’s best 
strate
 as in that game, 
the o
securities litigation, but such an outcome will never emerge.  Thus, this 
 
gy is to sue and to hope that B will not reciprocate, and vice-versa. 
The two parties might be able to solve this dilemma by 
communicating, but this likely is impossible for modern shareholders, who 
are often so dispersed that communication is prohibitively expensive.  And 
even if shareholders could express to each other a desire to avoid suit, the 
size of the class and the possibility of hold-outs would make consummating 
an enforceable arrangement unlikely.  As a result, shareholders resemble 
the classic, isolated prisoners in the original dilemma, and,
utcome of securities litigation is thus Pareto-inferior. 
By no means does the prisoners’ dilemma describe perfectly the real 
world of securities litigation.  Most importantly, the temporal condition is 
only imperfectly satisfied.  Unlike two segregated prisoners subject to 
interrogation, shareholders accrue 10b-5 claims and thus face decisions to 
sue at different times.45  (The impossibility of cooperation or coordination 
among shareholders, however, mitigates this imperfection.)46  Still, the 
previous analysis shows that shareholders might desire a world without 
 45. Some scholars attempt to differentiate this example due to the lack of formalized 
institutional constraints.  See Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, Institutions Matter!  
Why the Herder Problem is Not a Prisoners’ Dilemma, 66 THEORY & DECISION, 
(forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1114541 (arguing that 
institutional impediments to communication and cooperation in the standard Prisoners’ 
Dilemma ensure a dominant strategy of defection, while these circumstances are absent in 
the Herder Problem).  For a caution against excessive use of the prisoners’ dilemmas to 
model social behavior, see also Martin Shubik, Game Theory, Behavior, and the Paradox 
of the Prisoners’ Dilemma:  Three Solutions, 14 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 181, 181 (1970) (“The 
very simplicity of this game is a danger.  Anologies [sic] between it and human affairs are 
best employed to study their inadequacies and to pinpoint what has been left out rather than 
to claim how much of the world can be packed into a 2 x 2 matrix.”). 
 46. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the 
Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 98–101 (1985) (discussing shareholder coordination 
and incentive problems). 
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analysis provides insight into a collective action problem47 that plagues 
securities litigation:  even if a critical mass of investors stopped suing, the 
minority would still have incentives to defect and reap the profits of suit.  
Shareholders who have already accrued a right of action against a company 
for a 10b-5 violation have incentives to sue and hope that their 
counterparties refrain from doing the same.  But even then, shareholders 
realistically cannot bind themselves to any particular solution.  Contractual 
agreements between shareholders as a whole are obviously infeasible 
because of collective action problems and the extreme transactions costs 
that would accompany an effort to organize and negotiate collectively.48 
II.  MEASURING SOCIAL OPTIMALITY:  CONSIDERATION OF 
EXTERNALITIES 
Although shareholder coordination is impossible, the law arguably 
ought to approximate the bargains that society would strike were “all [its] 
members . . . somehow [to] be assembled.”49  Hypothetically speaking, if 
investors could execute a fully-specified contract about when and to what 
extent they would bring securities class actions, to what terms would they 
agree?50  The California Micro Devices court noted that, viewed ex ante, 
 47. See MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION 3 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1987) (defining collective action problems as inclusive of prisoners’ dilemma games 
and related to situations where “rational egoists are unlikely to succeed in cooperating to 
promote their common interests”). 
 48. Cf. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics:  An 
Analysis of Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1068-69 (1990) (“This 
analytic method often is described as the ‘hypothetical bargain’ approach.  Under this 
approach . . . courts would evaluate whether the managers’ actions were consistent with the 
terms of a hypothetical fully specified, contingent contract that informed, value-maximizing 
investors would have agreed to ex ante.”).  For a discussion of the hypothetical bargaining 
approach in relation to opting-out of fiduciary duties and other issues of corporate law, 
compare Jonathan R. Macey, Courts and Corporations:  A Comment on Coffee, 89 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1692 (1989) (defending the ex ante contracting approach) with John C. Coffee, The 
Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law:  An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1624–25, 1679 (1989) (critiquing the hypothetical bargaining 
approach and noting that it “invites the court to engage in an extraordinary range of judicial 
speculations about what maximizes shareholder value”). 
 49. Richard Posner, Epstein’s Tort Theory:  A Critique, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 457, 460 
(1979) (discussing whether society would impose ex ante a duty to rescue if such contracts 
were possible). 
 50. The answer to this question partly depends on assumptions about the participants.  
Research in behavioral economics suggests that “[p]eople tend to focus on what is 
immediately before them, ignoring secondary effects that they could easily imagine.”  
Jonathan Baron & Edward J. McCaffery, Starving the Beast:  The Political Psychology of 
Budget Deficits, in FISCAL CHALLENGES:  AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO 
BUDGET POLICY 221, 224 (Elizabeth Garrett, Elizabeth A. Graddy & Howell E. Jackson, 
eds., 2008).  Thus, the mass of shareholders might ignore long-term problems, such as the 
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repeat investors should not necessarily want to maximize their recovery in 
any given case: 
When an institutional investor’s transactions are viewed in the 
aggregate, the institutional or repeat investor can be seen as an 
equity shareholder in the markets as a whole, and accordingly can 
be expected to value a settlement for its effect on the larger 
market.  Given this longer-term perspective, it seems likely that 
an institutional investor’s first priority will not be to maximize 
recovery in any given case, since the recovery maximized in one 
case may simply be lost in a settlement paid out by a company in 
which the institution owns shares in another case.51 
The court’s argument, that institutional investors will demand settlements 
only to the extent necessary to deter fraud, presents some interesting 
questions.  Should the court have limited its reasoning to institutional 
investors when “the most popular mutual fund in the world” is an index of 
the S&P 500?52  If common investors diversify, would they also litigate 
only to the extent that deterrence requires?  What would the court make of 
the fact that so many institutional investors fail to bring claims at all?53  
Are such actors implicitly concluding that such litigation does not produce 
any non-compensatory bene
This Part attempts to shed some light on the question of whether 
positive externalities to suits might justify the private enforcement of § 
10(b).  Subpart A briefly considers whether there might be benefits 
associated with compensation, and Subpart B discusses whether deterrence 
justifies securities litigation as currently practiced or otherwise.  Although a 
definitive conclusion as to whether the deterrent effect of securities class 
actions is cost-justified falls beyond the scope of this Comment, several 
anecdotal factors suggest that the current securities regime over-deters 
fraud.  Furthermore, in light of cheaper alternatives, such as enhanced 
enforcement efforts by the SEC, it is possible that the class action 
mechanism is undesirable. 
misallocation of capital that results from undeterred securities fraud, and instead 
exclusively focus on short-term issues, such as transactions costs that stem from litigation.  
If this cognitive shortcoming characterized negotiations, they would almost definitely 
prohibit securities litigation.  Yet, courts that employ an ex ante contract approach likely 
assume that participants are fully rational; to do otherwise would invite sub-optimal results. 
 51. In re California Micro Devices Sec. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 257, 272 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
 52. See James K. Glassman, Exchange-Traded Funds, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2004, at 
F1 (referring to the Vanguard 500-stock index fund). 
 53. See Gilles, infra note 168 (referring to the prevalence of class action waivers that 
apply to shareholders who purchase common stock). 
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A.  Externalities Related to Compensating Shareholders 
Is there some inherent value to compensation?  If anything, 
compensation through securities class actions may be socially harmful.  As 
previously discussed, litigation is an extremely inefficient form of 
redistribution,54 and alternatives such as insurance or governmental 
redistribution are substantially cheaper.55  The prevalence of securities 
litigation thus creates substantial transactions costs, and these costs have 
redistributive effects that are not necessarily benign.  This section first 
argues that securities litigation fails to provide an effective compensatory 
mechanism on its own terms, and then discusses the adverse effects from 
redistribution among shareholders. 
1.  Practical Difficulties of Compensation 
Even setting aside its larger theoretical problems, the compensatory 
rationale fails on its own terms:  actual damages are difficult to estimate, 
and average recoveries are miniscule compared to even plaintiff-friendly 
estimates of shareholder losses. 
Practical limitations on litigants’ abilities to estimate damages 
accurately render the compensatory value of securities class actions 
unclear.  The amount of damages in any given case is surprisingly 
uncertain, as calculations inevitably rely on statistical models that introduce 
“a fatal amount of uncertainty” in even the best circumstances.56  
Generally, the first step to estimate damages is to predict per-share losses 
that result from the defendant’s misrepresentation or omission.  Parties 
commonly use event studies to make these predictions, but even these 
relatively non-controversial econometric tools rely on various economic 
assumptions that, when slightly altered, can produce greatly divergent 
 54. See supra Parts I.A and II.A (explaining that litigants have little to gain from 
securities litigation because it is not cost-effective). 
 55. See generally SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 281 (noting the excessively high 
administrative costs of litigation); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is 
Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994) 
(noting same). 
 56. Alexander, supra note 8, at 1492 (noting the difficulties in restructuring the exact 
damages for each of the shares).  For a general discussion of various methodologies that 
courts use to calculate damages, see Edward S. Adams & David E. Runkle, Solving a 
Profound Flaw in Fraud-on-the-Market Theory:  Utilizing a Derivative of Arbitrage 
Pricing Theory to Measure Rule 10b-5 Damages, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1097 (1997) (stating 
that the Capital Asset-Pricing Model does not apply to measuring damages in Rule 10b-5 
suits); John Finnerty & George Pushner, An Improved Two-Trader Model for Measuring 
Damages in Securities Fraud Actions, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 213 (2003) (listing various 
factors that a court must consider to calculate damages in Rule 10b-5 suits). 
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results.57  Furthermore, Professor Alexander notes that event studies “do[] 
not, and perhaps cannot, disaggregate the market’s reaction to the effect of 
the information itself on the firm’s value from the litigation-related 
components of the reaction to the disclosure” and thus are likely to 
“systematically overstate[] the class’s damages.”58 
The second step to calculate damages is to estimate the number of 
shares in the plaintiff class, or the number of traders that the 
misrepresentation or omission in question harmed.  Because it would be 
impracticable to reconstruct a share-by-share trading history,59 parties 
again employ statistical models, which they must tailor to the specifics of 
the market and discount to account for trading by “in-and-out” investors 
(who both purchased and sold during the class period and thus were not 
damaged)60 and “out-and-in” investors (who purchased before the 
misrepresentation or omission but sold during the class period).  Whether 
trading models can account for these two categories of traders “depend[s] 
critically on empirical assumptions about trading patterns” that “are subject 
to considerable doubt,”61 and thus produce estimates that dramatically 
under or overstate the actual aggregate class damages.62  Accordingly, 
“[b]ecause we have no reliable way of calculating what the appropriate 
amount of compensation should be, we are unable to judge whether class 
action litigation does a good job of delivering it.”63 
Another often-overlooked difficulty is the actual delivery of funds to 
harmed investors.  Although plaintiffs must expend resources to notify 
class members of the settlement, because “[t]here is presently no 
reasonably practical way to identify individually the members of the 
class—the persons who bought (or sold) shares during the class period,” 
 57. See Alexander, supra note 8, at 1491–92 (explaining that an event study depends 
upon many debatable factual assumptions); see also Jon Koslow, Note, Estimating 
Aggregate Damages in Class-Action Litigation Under Rule 10b-5 for Purposes of 
Settlement, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 811, 842 (1991) (“[I]t is important to recognize the 
complications and limitations in formulating damages estimates based on market behavior  
. . . .  Different reasonable assumptions may occasionally lead to widely varying results.”). 
 58. Janet Cooper Alexander, The Value of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 
UCLA L. REV. 1421, 1427 (1994). 
 59. See Alexander, supra note 8, at 1492 (noting such reconstruction would be 
infeasible not only because of its cost, but also because of the large numbers of shares that 
brokers hold in street name). 
 60. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (“An inflated purchase 
price will not by itself constitute or proximately cause the relevant economic loss . . . .  
[T]he inflated purchase payment is offset by ownership of a share that at that instant 
possesses equivalent value.” (emphasis removed)). 
 61. Alexander, supra note 8, at 1492. 
 62. Id. at 1492-93 (“It is possible that the most widely used model overstates actual 
aggregate class damages by 100 percent or more, even in a relatively short class period.”). 
 63. Id. at 1501. 
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only a small percentage of the class actually recovers.64  Professor 
Alexander suggests that a large number of shareholders, “representing as 
many as forty percent of the shares in the class,” generally fail to file 
claims.65  This not only calls the general compensatory efficacy of 
securities class actions into question, but also suggests that such litigation 
may most benefit sophisticated investors who are more likely to be aware 
of compensatory funds. 
2. Negative Effects of Redistribution 
Although the 1934 Act intends to protect retail investors,66 it actually 
may benefit sophisticated investors to a much greater extent.  Small retail 
investors tend to trade less frequently than sophisticated ones, given that 
smaller investors generally face higher brokerage fees and have less 
information on which to base trades.67  Consequently, they are more likely 
than sophisticated investors to adopt “buy and hold” strategies and thus to 
have bought before the beginning of the class period.68  Accordingly, 
securities class actions are more likely to transfer wealth from these small 
investors to their more sophisticated, institutional counterparts, which—
given their trading practices—are more likely members of the plaintiff 
class.  Professor Coffee argues that this produces an ironic result:  “[T]he 
clear winner under such a system is the more rapidly trading, undiversified 
investor—which is the profile of the contemporary hedge fund.  The 
clearest loser is the small investor who buys and holds for retirement—
exactly the profile of the American retail investor.”69 
Professor Janet Alexander also argues that securities litigation 
transfers wealth to institutional investors for a second reason:  institutional 
investors are more likely to diversify than retail investors.70  This may be 
true at the margins, especially if unsophisticated investors tend to think 
mistakenly that they are diversified when they are not, whether because 
their portfolio is biased toward a particular industry or otherwise.  Still, the 
magnitude of this effect probably is relatively low for two reasons.  First, 
the ease of investing in highly diversified mutual funds and the dramatic 
decreases in brokerage fees over the past decade likely have increased the 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. DONNA M. NAGY, RICHARD W. PAINTER & MARGARET V. SACHS, SECURITIES 
LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT 2–3 (West Publishing Co. 2nd ed. 2007) (characterizing 
the securities legislation of the 1930’s as a response to rampant fraud). 
 67. See Finnerty & Pushner, supra note 56. 
 68. Coffee, supra note 6, at 1560–61. 
 69. Id. at 1560. 
 70. See Alexander, supra note 8, at 1502 (“[R]ecoveries from class action litigation 
represent a windfall to large investors.”). 
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diversification of even the most unsophisticated investors.  Second, 
diversifying is relatively easy; studies suggest that a shareholder may need 
as few as only twenty different stocks to achieve the full benefits of a fully 
diversified portfolio.71 
B.  Externalities Related to the Deterrence of Securities Fraud 
In light of the questionable compensatory value of securities class 
actions, securities litigation is desirable mainly to the extent that it 
produces a genuine deterrent effect.  Deterrence is desirable not because 
securities fraud directly harms investors (diversification resolves this 
concern), but because such fraud produces negative externalities:  it 
reduces investors’ confidence in the economy; creates inaccurate pricing 
signals, facilitating the misallocation of capital;72 and reduces the 
efficiency of incentive structures that govern, for example, takeovers and 
executive compensation.73  Because of these externalities, the question is 
not whether the law should deter securities fraud, but simply how the law 
should do so.  But, despite the seeming appeal of securities litigation in this 
capacity, the current regime’s efficacy is questionable for two reasons.  
First, securities class actions are an incomplete deterrent, and second, 
evidence suggests that the current system 
1.  Gaps in Deterrence 
Although the negative externalities of securities fraud demand a 
response, private enforcement of Rule 10b-5 may not be the best or even an 
effective means of deterrence.  In this capacity, securities class actions are 
of questionable value because they cannot reach certain activities and 
generally fail to influence the most culpable individuals. 
 71. See SUK H. KIM, SEUNG H. KIM & KENNETH A. KIM, GLOBAL CORPORATE FINANCE 
396 (Blackwell Publ’g 5th ed. 2002) (“As an investor increases the number of securities in 
a portfolio, the portfolio’s risk declines rapidly at first, then slowly approaches the 
systematic risk of the market . . . .  However, the addition of more securities beyond 20 or 
30 reduces risk very little.”). 
 72. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 6, at 1565 (arguing that, while impossible to quantify, 
scandals such as WorldCom and Enron had the cumulative effect of shaking investor 
confidence).  But see Stout, supra note 5, at 637 (arguing that stock prices play less of a 
role in allocating capital than commonly believed); Summers, supra note 5, at 598 (same). 
 73. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 6, at 1565-66.  Some scholars also argue that 
securities litigation itself creates positive externalities when it acts “as an ex-post 
mechanism to discipline managers of companies with relatively weak ex-ante corporate 
governance control.”  Choi, supra note 6, at 1484.  Yet, other scholars contend that 
enhancing shareholder rights so that shareholders themselves act as a great check on 
management achieves the same effect.  See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 6, at 1784–85 
(discussing reforms to increase shareholder oversight of corporate governance). 
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a. Thresholds for Litigation 
Fraud by small issuers is practically immune to private enforcement of 
Rule 10b-5.  Plaintiffs’ firms will file class actions only when the expected 
fee award, discounted by the probability of failure, is greater than their 
anticipated expenses.  As a result, plaintiffs’ firms will lack incentives to 
bring suits where a fraud produces only a small drop in a stock’s price or a 
company has a relatively low market capitalization.74  Although the precise 
threshold of immunity is fluid and difficult to ascertain, given that 
immunity depends on variables like the size of damages, the probability of 
success, and attorneys’ estimates of the amount of work necessary to 
litigate the case, most scholars agree that “smaller sized offerings hardly 
ever experience a securities-fraud suit.”75  The Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act’s (PSLRA’s) heightened pleading standards and stay on 
discovery also will likely raise this threshold.76 
To some extent, this type of fraud is admittedly less worrisome; by 
definition, it is small.  But, when aggregated, such fraud “may be 
nonetheless significant” and “may result in investors requiring unduly high 
discounts to purchase such shares, hurting the ability of newer companies 
to turn to the capital markets for financing.”77  Furthermore, the perception 
of fraud among even small companies still may subvert the 1934 Act’s goal 
of preserving investors’ confidence in the markets. 
b.  Deterrence of Individuals 
Most importantly, securities class actions lack the ability to deter the 
most culpable parties—the individuals who are actually responsible for 
making the misrepresentation or omission at issue.  Courts force such 
defendants to contribute personally to settlements only in the rarest of 
 74. Coffee, supra note 6, at 1543 (“[T]he conventional wisdom has long been that 
companies with small market capitalizations are less likely to be sued in securities class 
actions.”). 
 75. James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market:  Empirical 
Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 936 (1996); see Coffee, 
supra note 6, at 1543–44 (discussing research related to this form of immunity). 
 76. See Choi, supra note 6, at 1499 (speculating that the heightened standards prevent 
attorneys from bringing suit when they otherwise would do so).  Professors Stephen M. 
Bainbridge and G. Mitu Gulati also predict that certain heuristics such as “puffery” and 
“bespeaks caution” create enclaves of immunity where the court tolerates some low-level 
fraudulent behavior to simplify its decision-making.  See Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu 
Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize?  (The Same Way Everybody Else Does—Boundedly):  
Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 119–26 (2002) (noting 
the effectiveness of puffery and the lack of judicial expertise regarding financial market 
dynamics). 
 77. Choi, supra note 6, at 1474. 
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circumstances, and the threat of litigation accordingly is an imperfect 
deterrent.78  One study that examined cases filed between 1980 and 2004 
uncovered only “about a dozen instances since 1980” in which courts 
awarded “out-of-pocket liability for outside directors.”79  Professor Coffee 
analyzed this and other studies, and concluded that “[t]he reality is that 
corporate insiders are sued in order for the plaintiffs to gain access to their 
insurance, but their personal liability appears not to be seriously 
pursued.”80  Moreover, access to insurance itself is unlikely to modify 
behavior; given that corporations pay for Directors’ and Officers’ (D&O) 
insurance, one cannot expect that the threat of increased premiums after a 
settlement will restrain corpo 81
Another explanation for the lack of personal liability stems from the 
principal-agent problems that trouble insurer-insured and corporate 
relationships.82  The two actors that one might expect would provide 
oversight—insurance companies and boards of directors—lack adequate 
incentives and abilities to perform in this capacity.  The fundamental 
problem is that officers have overwhelming incentives to settle because, if 
found liable, they may consequently lose their insurance coverage.83  
Insurers could oppose settlements when they predict that a court would find 
 78. See supra text accompanying notes 15–32 (discussing the expense of shareholder 
litigation and the distribution of the court awarded liabilities).  According to Professor 
Coffee, instances of personal liability usually involve “special facts” where either the 
defendant corporation has become judgment-proof, the individual defendants face criminal 
liability, or the individual defendants’ D&O insurance is inadequate or has been rescinded.  
Coffee, supra note 6, at 1551. 
 79. Black et al., supra note 24, at 1138–39. 
 80. Coffee, supra note 6, at 1551.  Individuals undoubtedly face non-pecuniary 
costs of litigation, such as damage to reputation, that produce deterrent effects.  But, 
officers’ ability to settle without admitting liability minimizes these effects. 
 81. See Alexander, supra note 8, at 1498 (stating that the culpable individuals hardly 
ever contribute to a settlement because insurance typically pays over half of the amount).  
Nevertheless, while the threat of increased premiums might not sway corporate officers, the 
threat of termination may be more persuasive.  Research indicates that the incidence of 
securities litigation makes CEO turnover more likely, but Professor Coffee argues that “this 
risk, by itself, would seldom constitute a deterrent threat capable of offsetting the 
potentially enormous financial gains to insiders from inflating the firm’s stock price.”  
Coffee, supra note 6, at 1554. 
 82. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) 
(discussing agency costs in the context of the firm); see also Elliott J. Weiss & John S. 
Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring:  How Institutional Investors Can Reduce 
Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053 (1995) (discussing agency 
costs as applied to securities actions). 
 83. D&O insurance contracts often exclude cases in which the insured commits actual 
fraud.  See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter?  A Study of Settlements in 
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 549–57 (1991) (criticizing this situation as 
one that creates incentives for frivolous litigation). 
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the insured liable; after all, insurance companies are well-situated to absorb 
the risk of trial and theoretically should litigate cases if doing so would be 
cost-justified.  “Yet securities class actions do not go to trial, settlements 
may not reflect the merits, and insurance companies fund such 
settlements.”84  Professor Alexander presents several reasons why insurers 
generally fund even potentially non-meritorious settlements:  they may fear 
liability for a bad faith refusal to settle,85 they may be incapable of gauging 
the merits of any given case,86 or they simply may be able to incorporate 
the cost of settling even a large number of non-meritorious claims into their 
premiums.87 
Theoretically, the board of directors also should be able to oversee the 
use of corporate funds in settlements.  The board, however, rarely acts in 
this fashion.  More frequently, the board indemnifies corporate officials 
rather than attempts to ensure that such individuals pay as much of the 
settlement as possible.88  Board members are likely to be sympathetic to the 
implicated officers and may themselves be defendants in the suit.89  
Furthermore, regardless of whether they are sued, board members “have 
little capacity (and perhaps even less incentive) to monitor the complex 
details and complicated procedures of securities litigation.”90 
Even without the effects of indemnification and insurance, the system 
still may fail to deter individual defendants.  One such deterrence failure is 
the “final-period” problem that occurs “as the manager faces the prospect 
of job loss.”91  Once a manager expects to be fired, his or her “incentives 
 84. Id. at 561. 
 85. Professor Alexander explains the risks associated with an insurer’s refusal to settle 
as follows: 
If an insurer refuses a settlement offer within policy limits and a later trial 
results in a judgment greater than the proposed settlement, the insurer may be 
held liable for the entire amount of the judgment . . . .  Since the amount of the 
potential judgment in securities class actions is normally far greater than the 
face amount of any applicable insurance, the large sums involved provide an 
incentive for the insurer to settle, just as for the parties. 
Id. at 561–62. 
 86. Id. at 562–63. 
 87. Id. at 563–64. 
 88. Public policy does not allow indemnification of individuals who actually violate 
securities laws, see Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969) 
(holding indemnity agreement unenforceable where shareholder action charged individuals 
with securities violations), but corporate officers can sidestep this exception easily if they 
settle in a way that does not admit liability.  Because plaintiffs have no particular interest 
in the source of settlement funds, they will be indifferent to admissions or denials of 
liability. 
 89. See Coffee, supra note 6, at 1567 (“[Board members] may have been sued in the 
past, giving them a closer identification with the interests of the officer-defendants than 
with those of the shareholders.”). 
 90. Id. at 1566–67. 
 91. Id. at 1554 n.79; see Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability 
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are no longer aligned with those of the shareholders, and the manager 
cannot be as easily deterred by future private sanctions or reputational 
loss.”92  Assuming, as is likely, that a company employs intentional 
misrepresentations and omissions when it experiences turmoil, and an 
officers’ job is thus in jeopardy, the final period problem severely limits 
effective deterrence.  Simply put, when an officer anticipates termination, 
he or she will be more likely to roll the dice and hope to gain time to “turn 
the company around” by, for example, disclosing misrepresentative 
earnings information or engaging in accounting tricks.93  Moreover, such 
individuals often are over-optimistic regarding their chances of success.94 
 2. Over-Deterrence 
One would expect an optimal deterrent to consist of a penalty or an 
award of damages equal to the net social harm of the undesirable activity 
multiplied by its probability of detection.95  The net social harm of 
securities fraud, however, consists only of externalities;96 because every 
victimized trader’s loss is a windfall for the trader who engaged in the 
opposite transaction, the net social harm of a misrepresentation or 
for Fraud on Securities Markets:  Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691 (1992) 
(providing a more thorough discussion of final period problems). 
 92. Coffee, supra note 6, at 1554 n.79.  Melvin Eisenberg explains further the issues 
that concern boards of directors: 
Boards typically meet only six to twelve times a year.  The complex business of 
a publicly held corporation cannot be managed with such a limited investment of 
time.  Boards include persons who either are not managers at all or are managers 
whose experience lies in different businesses.  The complex businesses of a 
publicly held corporation cannot be managed by such persons. 
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of Directors and Internal Control, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 
237, 237 (1997). 
 93. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1538–39 (1998) (relying on behavioral 
economics to predict that bounded rationality and willpower may lead individuals to ignore 
deterrence, as traditional economic reasoning predicts); see also Gary T. Schwartz, Reality 
in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law:  Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 
377 (1994–1995) (highlighting general flaws in tort law as an optimal deterrent). 
 94. Generally, individuals are unrealistically optimistic about their chances of success.  
Thus, corporate managers might overestimate their chances to “get away” with a 
misrepresentation or omission.  This bias explains, for example, why individuals predict 
that they are “above average” drivers, or why couples report numbers over 100% when 
asked what percentage of the domestic work they do.  Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral 
Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1182-84 (1997). 
 95. See supra text accompanying note 7 (noting challenges with defining the contours 
of harm from securities fraud). 
 96. See James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 497 (1997) (providing a broader discussion of such externalities and the additional 
rationales for stringent regulation). 
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omission, by itself, is zero.97  Accordingly, whether the current system 
generates a desirable level of deterrence depends on the size of estimated 
penalties relative to the size of security fraud’s externalities.  If the size of 
expected penalties dwarfs such externalities, the result is over-deterrence.98  
This section discusses evidence that supports the current scheme’s 
tendency to over-deter rather than under-deter and then discusses the 
potential costs of such excess deterrence. 
a.  Incidence of Over-Deterrence 
It is likely impossible, and in any event beyond the scope of this 
Comment, to estimate the precise monetary penalties that optimally would 
deter securities fraud.  Nevertheless, some evidence suggests that the 
pendulum has shifted closer to over- than under-deterrence.  Though 
settlements have increased in average size in recent years,99 many factors 
aside from private enforcement of 10b-5 also deter fraudulent behavior.  
The most obvious examples are enforcement by public agencies and self-
regulatory organizations (SROs), such as the NYSE.  According to data 
compiled by Professor Howell Jackson in 2004, the SEC imposed $3.1 
billion in civil penalties, and state agencies imposed an additional $931 
million.100  The NASD and NYSE also levied $697 million in penalties, 
which resulted in overall public sanctions in excess of $4.7 billion in 2004 
alone.101  Although these amounts are small in comparison to the payments 
attributable to class actions ($5.5 billion in 2004),102 public enforcement 
nevertheless provides a vigorous deterrent. 
Aside from the threat of SEC investigation and penalties, firms also 
internalize the risk of criminal prosecution by the DOJ and states, potential 
liability through piggyback suits such as those under ERISA or derivative 
claims, the risk of takeovers or proxy contests by dissatisfied shareholders, 
 97. See supra Part I.A (explaining compensatory rationales for shareholder litigation). 
 98. Professor Alexander explains: 
[C]ompensating [individual class members] for their market losses does not 
produce optimal deterrence.  If defendants actually had to pay such gigantic 
damages, there would seem to be overdeterrence in virtually every case.  
Aggregate class trading losses are probably greater than either the true net 
social cost of the violation or the benefits received by the violator, both of 
which are speculative in nature and difficult to calculate. 
Alexander, supra note 8, at 1498. 
 99. See Cornerstone Research, supra note 19 (discussing the current rise in securities 
litigation and the increased Disclosure Dollar Losses in 2007). 
 100.  Howell E. Jackson, Regulatory Intensity in the Regulation of Capital Markets:  A 
Preliminary Comparison of Canadian and U.S. Approaches 113 tbl.14 (2006), available at 
http://www.tfmsl.ca/docs/V6(2)%20Jackson.pdf. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. 
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and the severe damage to reputation that accompanies litigation and 
investigation.103  And corporate officers are unlikely to miss the correlation 
between the incidence of securities litigation and CEO turnover.104 
In addition to alternate means of deterrence (which might be increased 
in a first-best world),105 some anecdotal evidence suggests that current 
methods of private enforcement simply are too extreme.  To the extent that 
they exist, strike suits constitute a potentially unnecessary deterrent 
because they tax innocent conduct at a rate equal to their nuisance value.  
Also, regardless of the actual frequency of such “frivolous” litigation, 
evidence suggests that corporate officers think it is commonplace, and 
“[t]hese beliefs, however erroneous, may lead to over-deterrence.”106  
These perceptions, though perhaps inaccurate, are easy to understand.  
Despite the PSLRA’s heightened pleading standards,107 the number of 
securities suits filed each year has generally increased.  From 1991 to 1995, 
when Congress passed the PSLRA, an average of 197.4 suits was filed per 
year, but the average jumped to 242.75 for 1996 through 2007.108  
 103. But see Prentice, supra note 17, at 1427-28 (discussing research that suggests 
concerns about damage to reputation are insufficient deterrents). 
 104. See Philip E. Strahan, Securities Class Actions, Corporate Governance and 
Managerial Agency Problems (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
10,4356, 1998), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=104356 (pointing to a sharp increase 
in CEO turnover after class action filings). 
 105.  See infra Part III (reviewing reforms that aim to approximate shareholders’ ex ante 
interests). 
 106.  See Alexander, supra note 8, at 1495 (explaining that corporate managers 
overestimate the probability of being sued and do not believe that juries will decide cases 
rationally).  A possible explanation for this overestimation is the availability heuristic, 
which is—in its most basic form—people’s tendency to overestimate the frequency of 
events that they read about in newspapers.  See Jolls et al., supra note 93, at 1519 
(describing how “Availability Entrepreneurs” exploit the availability heuristic).  Over-
optimism, however, is a potentially contrary influence.  See Sunstein, supra note 94, at 9 
(predicting that over-optimism may lead people to take harmful risks due to an unrealistic 
feeling of immunity).  Determining which of these influences dominates is an empirical 
question. 
 107.  Easterbrook & Fischel explain the heightened pleadings standard as follows: 
The interaction of the scienter requirement with the damages rule should get rid 
of excessive (or, what is the same thing, inaccurate) enforcement . . . .  If the 
scienter rule does not filter out dubious cases, on the other hand—if it turns out 
always to be possible to find some culpable omission when things go bad—then 
loss-based damages are far too high, and it is necessary to put a more modest 
remedy in their place. 
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 644. 
 108.  Stephanie Plancich, Brian Saxton & Svetlana Starykh, Recent Trends in 
Shareholder Class Actions:  Filings Return to 2005 Levels as Subprime Cases Take 
Off; Average Settlements Hit New High 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, New York, 
N.Y., 2007) [hereinafter NERA] (describing recent trends in shareholder class actions).  
Although the number of suits that plaintiffs filed was rather low in 2005 and 2006 (205 
and 131, respectively), the number of filings has increased again.  See Cornerstone 
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Although this data may simply reflect other variables, such as an increase 
in the actual amount of fraud, it helps to explain why businesses perceive 
such a threat from securities class actions despite favorable legal changes 
like the P
An empirical study of stock price reactions to In re Silicon Graphics 
Inc.,109 which heightened pleading standards for scienter in the Ninth 
Circuit, similarly supports these conclusions and the over-deterrence 
hypothesis.  The study, conducted by professors Marilyn F. Johnson, Karen 
K. Nelson, and A.C. Pritchard, found that the stock prices of companies 
with a high probability of being sued reacted positively to the decision.110  
The fact that shareholders perceive restrictions on Rule 10b-5 litigation 
positively suggests that the current enforcement regime reduces 
shareholder value. 
b.  Costs of Over-Deterrence 
Because securities fraud does not produce any social value,111 one 
might initially assume that such fraud cannot be “over-deterred.”  But, 
deterrence has a price, and the current system of criminal, public, and 
expansive private enforcement may have grown such that the marginal 
costs of additional deterrence far surpass its benefit.  Excessive deterrence 
has two types of costs. 
First, to the extent that over-deterrence increases the ease with which 
plaintiffs’ attorneys can bring non-meritorious suits,112 it acts as a tax on 
normal business activities and ultimately reduces shareholder returns.  If 
the system aimed deterrence perfectly such that it targeted only actual 
instances of fraud, it would minimize the taxing effect.  But rule 10b-5 
Research, supra note 19, at 6 (explaining the modest number of filings in recent years with 
unusually low volatility in the stock market). 
 109.  183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 110. See Johnson et al., supra note 34 (explaining the Supreme Court’s view that 
securities litigation may be disruptive to business); see also Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana 
Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral Finance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 455, 529–30 
(2006) (discussing the Johnson et al. study). 
 111.  But see Macey & Miller, supra note 48 (concluding that corporations can use 
misrepresentations and omissions in certain circumstances strategically to increase 
shareholder value). 
 112.  See sources cited infra note 114 (characterizing most securities fraud cases as 
frivolous); Patrick M. Garry et al., The Irrationality of Shareholder Class Action Suits:  A 
Proposal for Reform, 49 S.D. L. REV. 275 (2004) (arguing that securities class actions fail 
to deter fraud and result in non-meritorious litigation); Donald C. Langevoort, Capping 
Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 650–53 (1996) 
(discussing non-merit based pressures to settle).  Judge Henry Friendly also expressed 
concern that class action litigation facilitates “blackmail settlements.”  HENRY J. 
FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION:  A GENERAL VIEW 120 (Columbia Univ. Press 
1973). 
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lacks this surgical precision.  Despite attempts to screen out frivolous 
litigation by, for example, heightening pleading standards for scienter,113 
securities class actions remain relatively blunt instruments.  Studies suggest 
that plaintiffs frequently file suits in response to large stock drops with the 
hopes to extract a settlement,114 and courts have acknowledged that the 
nuisance value of these suits often forces defendants to settle.115  
Accordingly, by causing excessive non-meritorious litigation, the current 
environment may unnecessarily increase costs for business and 
shareholders, especially with recent increases in the size of settlements.116 
These increased costs also may reduce the attractiveness of U.S. 
capital markets to foreign issuers.  The Committee on Capital Markets 
Regulation compiled evidence that suggests this effect already exists:  in 
recent years, the U.S. share of IPOs and secondary offerings has decreased 
as a percentage of total value; the U.S. share of global IPOs (offerings of 
firms that list on exchanges both in their home country and outside of it) 
has decreased; foreign issuers have increased their use of private rule 144A 
markets relative to public market usage; and foreign companies have 
increased de-listings from the NYSE dramatically in recent years.117  
Although many factors other than securities litigation may fuel these 
changes, “[f]oreign companies commonly cite the U.S. enforcement system 
as the most important reason why they do not want to list in the U.S. 
 113. See, e.g., Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007) (holding 
that courts must take opposing inferences into account to determine whether plaintiffs have 
pled a strong inference of scienter). 
 114. See, e.g., Choi, supra note 6, at 1476–99 (discussing empirical literature); see also 
Bohn & Choi, supra note 75, at 979 (“Empirical results show that most securities-fraud 
class actions are, in fact, frivolous.”). 
 115. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975) (“[T]o the 
extent that [securities litigation] permits a plaintiff with a largely groundless claim to 
simply take up the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing an 
in terrorem increment of the settlement value . . . it is a social cost rather than a benefit.”); 
Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(requiring plaintiffs to prove that defendants’ alleged misrepresentations proximately caused 
their economic loss to qualify for certification); Parnes v. Gateway, 122 F.3d 539, 549 (8th 
Cir. 1997) (noting that heightened pleading standards intended to “deter[] the use of 
complaints as a pretext for fishing expeditions of unknown wrongs designed to compel in 
terrorem settlements”); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely To Extract a 
Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 437 (1988) (offering a more general discussion of the 
incentives to initiate frivolous suits). 
 116.  See Cornerstone Research, supra note 19 (reviewing the size and prevalence of 
settlements and verdicts in securities class actions). 
 117.  See Comm. on Capital Mkt. Reg., The Competitive Position of the U.S. 
Public Equity Market 5 (2007) (summarizing competitiveness measures); see also id. at 22 
(explaining that, although de-listings from the NYSE are disconcerting for any reason, they 
may be in part attributable to more lenient SEC deregistration rules that became effective 
in June 2007). 
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market.”118 
Second, over-deterrence also can have detrimental effects on pricing 
signals, which reduces the stock market’s efficiency in allocating capital.  
Corporate officers who fear strike suits or that an irrational jury will find 
them liable face incentives to make as few statements as possible to the 
market.119  The result is that, especially with regard to the dissemination of 
optimistic information, 10b-5 class actions “deter not only fraud but also 
the provision of beneficial information.”120  The PSLRA’s safe harbor for 
forward-looking information intended to counteract this effect, but it is an 
imperfect solution; as long as plaintiffs can survive a motion to dismiss, 
they can still extract a settlement.121  Given that shareholders are better 
situated to absorb risk than corporate officers (shareholders are, after all, 
buying risk), it makes little sense to have a system that creates incentives 
for managerial over-caution.122 
III.  APPROXIMATING SHAREHOLDERS’ EX ANTE INTERESTS 
Courts have generally attempted to reform § 10(b) actions to deter 
non-meritorious litigation rather than to effectuate shareholders’ ex ante 
interests.  Two trends that demonstrate this strategy are reforms that favor 
early disposal and reforms that limit secondary liability. 
First, courts and the PSLRA have tweaked pleading standards for § 
10(b) cases to increase defendants’ ability to prevail on motions for 
summary judgment.  In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,123 for 
example, Justice Ginsburg noted that “[p]rivate securities fraud actions . . . 
can be employed abusively to impose substantial costs on companies and 
individuals whose conduct conforms to the law,”124 and the Court held that 
 118.  Comm. on Capital Mkt. Reg., Interim Report of the Committee on Capital 
Markets Regulation 11 (2006), available at 
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf. 
 119. Liability for material omissions, however, creates the opposite incentive to some 
extent. 
 120. Dunbar & Heller, supra note 110, at 528. 
 121. But see Marilyn F. Johnson, Ron Kasznik & Karen K. Nelson, The Impact of 
Securities Litigation Reform on the Disclosure of Forward-Looking Information by High 
Technology Firms, 39 J. ACCT. RES. 297, 323 (2001) (finding an increase in the number of 
forecasts following the PSLRA). 
 122. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 640 (explaining that moving risk to a 
less risk-averse group can produce economic gains).  Shareholders’ advantage in holding 
risk partially explains deference to managers in other contexts as well, such as the business 
judgment rule and corporations’ ability to amend their charters to waive duty of care 
liability under Delaware law.  See DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 8 § 102(b)(2003) (listing the 
required elements of a certificate of incorporation). 
 123. 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007). 
 124.  Id. at 2505. 
  
2009] SECURITIES LITIGATION AS A COORDINATION PROBLEM 503 
 
 
it must weigh opposing inferences when determining whether plaintiffs 
adequately pled a “strong inference” of scienter.125  Other courts have 
limited plaintiffs’ access to the class mechanism to achieve a similar effect.  
Although the Supreme Court prohibited “conduct[ing] a preliminary 
inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be 
maintained as a class action” in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,126 it softened 
this stance in subsequent years.  In General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. 
Falcon,127 the Court noted that “sometimes it may be necessary for the 
court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the 
certification question.”128  Later, in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,129 it 
held that courts must take a “close look at the case before it is accepted as a 
class action.”130  “[A] majority of courts of appeals that have addressed this 
issue” have sided with Falcon and Amchem rather than Eisen, holding that 
“a district court is not limited to the allegations raised in the complaint, and 
should instead make whatever legal and factual inquiries are necessary to 
an informed determination of the certification issues.”131  These decisions 
reflect courts’ concerns about the power of class certification, combined 
with the fact that, “[i]f it were appropriate for a court simply to accept the 
 125.  See id. (“The Act requires plaintiffs to state with particularity both the facts 
constituting the alleged violation, and the facts evidencing scienter, i.e., the 
defendant’s intention ‘to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.’”). 
 126.  417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974). 
 127.  457 U.S. 147 (1982). 
 128.  Id. at 160. 
 129. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 130.  Id. at 615 (quoting Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee:  
1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 390 
(1967)). 
 131.  In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2005); see also In re 
New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 24 (1st Cir. 2008) 
(reviewing various circuits’ approaches to determining relevant criteria under rule 23); In re 
Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41 (2d Cir. 2006) (requiring a “definitive 
assessment of Rule 23 requirements”); In re Xcelera.com Sec. Litig., 430 F.3d 503, 511 
(1st Cir. 2005) (discussing the level of inquiry); PolyMedica, 432 F.3d at 6 (stating the 
court’s “preference for the majority view”); Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 321 
(5th Cir. 2005) (noting that, while certification hearings “should not be mini-trials on the 
merits . . . [a]t the same time, however, ‘[g]oing beyond the pleadings is necessary, as a 
court must understand the claims, defenses, relevant facts, and applicable substantive law 
in order to make a meaningful determination of the certification issues.’” (quoting Castano 
v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 744 (5th Cir. 1996))); West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 
F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Tough questions [at the class-certification stage] must be 
faced and squarely decided, if necessary by holding evidentiary hearings and choosing 
between competing perspectives.”); Johnston v. HBO Film Mgmt., Inc., 265 F.3d 178, 189 
(3rd Cir. 2001) (“[N]ot only was it appropriate, but also necessary, for the district court to 
examine the factual record underlying plaintiffs’ allegations in making its certification 
decision.”); see also Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the 
Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1269 (2002) (defending vigorous class certification 
standards). 
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allegations of a complaint at face value . . . , every complaint asserting the 
requirements of rule 23(a) and (b) would automatically lead to a 
certification order.”132 
Courts’ treatment of secondary liability also exemplifies attempts by 
judges to tweak securities litigation and increase the scheme’s efficiency.  
In Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank,133 the Court held that there was no 
private right of action against aiding and abetting a §10(b) violation,134 but 
the Court left an important loophole:  it noted that courts still might hold 
secondary actors liable if the plaintiff satisfied standard elements of 
primary liability.135  Capitalizing on this exception,136 some lower courts 
 132. Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 365 (4th Cir. 2004).  The Fifth 
Circuit took this trend to a new extreme in Oscar Private Equity Investments. v. Allegiance 
Telecom, 487 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2007).  There, the court held that “loss causation must be 
established at the class certification stage by a preponderance of all admissible evidence,” 
and vacated a lower’s court decision to certify a class where the plaintiffs had not presented 
event studies to link the decline in stock price to a particular misrepresentation, as opposed 
to an unrelated news story or industry-wide factors.  Id. at 269.  The court explained that it 
“require[d] plaintiffs to establish loss causation in order to trigger the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption.”  Id. at 265.  This reflected an explicit desire to limit coercive class actions 
and, in particular, the fraud-on-the-market doctrine, when it stated:  “We cannot ignore the 
in terrorem power of certification, continuing to abide the practice of withholding until 
‘trial’ a merit inquiry central to the certification decision.”  Id. at 267.  Judge Higginbotham 
further reinforced this point by stating that “a district court’s certification order often 
bestows upon plaintiffs extraordinary leverage, and its bite should dictate the process that 
precedes it.”  Id.; see id. at 262 (characterizing as “lethal force” the result that fairness 
requires in light of certifications).  Oscar and other recent Fifth Circuit decisions promise 
to increase the costs of bringing securities fraud claims.  See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. 
Credit Suisse First Boston, 482 F.3d 372, 379 (5th Cir. 2007) (“As we have recognized, 
class certification may be the backbreaking decision that places ‘insurmountable pressure’ 
on a defendant to settle.” (citing Castano, 84 F.3d at 746)); Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 
F.3d 316, 322 (5th Cir. 2005) (defending “rigorous” standards of proof because, “given the 
realities of litigation costs, [class] certification can compel settlements without trial”).  
Oscar requires plaintiffs to hire experts to demonstrate loss causation, probably through 
econometric means.  Whether this will deter a significant amount of less-meritorious 
litigation, however, remains to be seen.  See Larry E. Ribstein, Fraud on a Noisy Market 
(Univ. of Ill. Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 39, 2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=803064 (discussing instances in which Congress and the courts 
have expressed dissatisfaction with the fraud-on the-market theory). 
 133. 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 134. Id. at 191 (“Because the text of § 10(b) does not prohibit aiding and abetting, we 
hold that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under § 10(b).”). 
 135. See id. (noting that secondary actors in the securities markets are not always 
free from liability just because they did not aid or abet under § 10(b), as “[a]ny person 
or entity . . . may be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5, assuming all of the 
requirements for primary liability under Rule 10b-5 are met.”). 
 136. Lower courts frequently expressed confusion regarding the intended breadth of this 
exception.  See, e.g., In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 236 F. Supp. 2d 161, 171–72 (D. 
Mass. 2003) (“But while it is well-established that § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 cover fraudulent 
schemes . . . the Supreme Court has never addressed the extent to which § 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 proscribe participation in such schemes.”). 
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established various scheme liability doctrines that imposed liability on 
secondary actors if they were “substantially involved in making the 
misstatements.”137  For example, the court in In re Lernout & Hauspie 
Securities Litigation138 upheld claims against a venture capital firm, an 
insurer, and the insurer’s CEO because they were integral participants in 
the fraud, despite the fact that they did not actually make any misstatements 
to the market.139  Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc.,140 however, promises to change the future treatment of similar 
cases.  In Stoneridge, the Supreme Court held that secondary actors may be 
found liable only if plaintiffs strictly relied on their actions to purchase or 
sell securities, and, in so doing, the Court stated explicitly that scheme 
liability “does not answer the objection that petitioner did not in fact rely 
upon respondents’ own deceptive conduct.”141  While the holding in 
Stoneridge did not reject scheme liability,142 it nevertheless represents a 
continuing trend in which the Court’s expressed fear of coercive 
settlements and subsequent harm to capital markets fuels its efforts to limit 
the breadth of the 10b-5 ri
This ad hoc approach to limiting 10b-5 liability is desirable to the 
extent that it reduces the “tax” on doing business imposed by non-
meritorious litigation, but piecemeal reforms will never resolve the 
underlying prisoners’ dilemma.  Individuals always will have incentives to 
sue so long as plaintiffs’ lawyers will take their cases, and the result may 
very well be suboptimal from a social welfare perspective.  Accordingly, 
the optimal solution is to replace the current scheme of 10b-5 liability with 
a scheme that shareholders would desire ex ante. 
This Part suggests solutions derived from responses to the prisoners’ 
dilemma.  Theorists generally state four ways to resolve the prisoners’ 
dilemma:  (1) facilitate cooperation; (2) iterate the game such that 
cooperative, tit-for-tat strategies may emerge; (3) alter the payouts by state 
action; or (4) form binding pre-commitment strategies.143  The first two 
possibilities do not suit the present context; despite the prevalence of 
 137. Taavi Annus, Note, Scheme Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 72 MO. L. REV. 855, 861 (2007); see id. at 859-63 (describing the 
three predominant scheme liability tests as the “bright line” test, the “substantial 
participation” test, and the “creation of misrepresentation” test); Nicholas Fortune 
Schanbaum, Note, Scheme Liability:  Rule 10b-5(a) and Secondary Actor Liability After 
Central Bank, 26 REV. LITIG. 183 (2007) (explaining both primary and secondary liability 
schemes). 
 138. 208 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D. Mass. 2002). 
 139. See id. at 77, 84-86. 
 140. 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008). 
 141. Id. at 771. 
 142.  See supra text accompanying note 11 (discussing whether Stoneridge ended the 
debate over scheme liability). 
 143. See generally ORDESHOOK, supra note 40 (explaining the prisoners’ dilemma). 
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institutional investors, cooperation among shareholders is likely cost-
prohibitive, and each individual investor is unlikely to face a sufficiently 
large number of iterations of the game to allow cooperation through tit-for-
tat strategies.144  The latter two options, however, present interesting 
possibilities for reform.  This Part proposes that the best option to resolve 
this dilemma is state action, followed by a second-best alternative of 
shareholder agreements to submit to non-class binding arbitration.145 
A.  Public Enforcement 
“The logic of the prisoners’ dilemma provides probably the most 
widely accepted, and certainly the most coherent, justifying theory of the 
state available today.”146  State action can reduce undesirable ex post 
incentives to sue in two ways:  first, the state could pass “legislation that 
coerces players to cooperate by sanctioning defection,”147 and, second, the 
state could remove the private right of action under 10b-5 to simply 
eliminate the game altogether.  The former option would use the state to 
alter the terms of the dilemma, and perhaps tax returns from such litigation 
at a rate high enough to discourage its incidence.  But, this would simply 
enact a less parsimonious version of the latter option to revert to 
exclusively public enforcement of Rule 10b-5.  Accordingly, this section 
discusses the latter solution, which mirrors a pre-commitment device to the 
extent that the state would remove the private right of action under 10b-5 
and “bind” shareholders to their preferred outcome.  Ironically, a 
commitment to exclusively public enforcement involves a reversal of state 
action,148 but it would resolve the basic coordination problem that underlies 
securities litigation; in essence, eliminating the private right of action 
would require all shareholders to choose to “cooperate” (not sue) and thus 
 144.  See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF CORPORATION 13-14 (Basic Books 
1984) (providing the seminal description of the tit-for-tat strategy and its optimality); see 
also Charles Lipson, Book Review, The Evolution of Cooperation, by Robert Axelrod, 81 
A.J.I.L. 470 (1987) (commenting on the tit-for-tat strategy). 
 145. This Comment presents these two possibilities only to spur discussion, not to 
represent them as the exclusive or even the most desirable options. 
 146. John M. Orbell & L. A. Wilson, Institutional Solutions to the N-Prisoners’ 
Dilemma, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 411, 411 (1978). 
 147. Susan Block-Lieb, Congress’ Temptation to Defect:  A Political and Economic 
Theory of Legislative Resolutions to Financial Common Pool Problems, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 
801, 819 (1997); see also id. at 818 (“When self-interested players cannot resolve these 
collective action problems on their own, they may look to the State for help.”). 
 148. Presumptively, Congress would have the authority to reverse state action.  But 
see Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1995) (discussing the 
SEC’s ability to remove the 10b-5 private of action); Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying 
Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws:  The Commission’s Authority, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 961 (1994) (discussing same). 
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resolve the dilemma. 
One way public enforcement might reduce coordination problems is to 
eliminate the incentives for non-meritorious litigation.  The SEC has no 
reason to pursue strike suits for the simple reason that its attorneys do not 
receive contingency fees.  Excluding non-pecuniary benefits associated 
with winning big cases, attorneys’ compensation probably would remain 
the same, regardless of the frequency, magnitude, or success of SEC 
investigations.  Accordingly, state action can better align incentives and 
account for the negative externalities of non-cooperation, such as the harms 
to business that result from excessive litigation.  “Just as some means of 
coordinating their behavior can get the two prisoners the lowest total years 
behind bars, so . . . can the state coordinate individual behavior to produce 
an ‘optimal’ level of negative and positive externalities.”149 
Dis-implying the private right of action under § 10(b) is not as radical 
as it might seem.  First, the courts already left certain areas—such as § 
17(a) of the Exchange Act150 and prosecution of individuals who aid and 
abet a § 10(b) violation151—exclusively in the SEC’s control, that is, 
without a private right of action.  Second, any proposal to enforce § 10(b) 
through public mechanisms naturally would include increased enforcement 
efforts by the SEC and the DOJ.152  Because “private litigation in the 
United States often follows on the heels of public sanctions,” the lost 
deterrent might be more duplicative than necessary.153 
Additionally, as a practical matter, the SEC is better-situated to 
investigate securities fraud effectively and can do so at a lower cost than 
the plaintiffs’ bar.  The SEC has enormous investigatory powers:154  it can 
 149. Orbell & Wilson, supra note 146, at 412. 
 150.  15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1988); see In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19 
F.3d 1291 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that only the Commission may enforce § 17(a) of the 
Exchange Act).  Several other sections of the Exchange Act also do not have private rights 
of action.  See Spicer v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch. Inc., 977 F.2d 255, 256 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(stating § 6(b) has no private right of action); In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litig., 494 F.2d 528, 
540–41 (3d Cir. 1974) (stating § 13(a) has no private right of action); Ciro Inc. v. Gold, 816 
F. Supp. 253, 269–70 (D. Del. 1993) (stating § 14(c) has no private right of action); see 
generally Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights, supra note 148, at n.75 (noting that the 
Supreme Court has found no private right of action under § 17a of the Exchange Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 78(a) (1988), or under § 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, as amended, 
15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1988)). 
 151. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 772 (2008) 
(noting that the PSLRA allows “the SEC to enforce aiding and abetting liability,” but does 
not imply a private right of action for the same). 
 152.  If nothing else, this probably is true for political reasons. 
 153.  Howell E. Jackson, The Impact of Enforcement:  A Reflection, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
400, 407 (2008); see James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics:  
An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 763 (2003) (examining the overlap between SEC 
securities enforcement and private securities fraud class actions). 
 154.  See generally SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d 1047, 1052–53 (2d 
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subpoena documents and examine witnesses with fewer procedural 
obstacles than private litigants; it can secure cooperation in even informal 
investigations by offering a carrot of secrecy; and it can threaten 
uncooperative firms with civil penalties, criminal sanctions, or “any 
equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of 
investors.”155  Moreover, public agencies critically deter fraud in the “gaps” 
where private rights of action fail, such as when the value of a lawsuit is 
too low to encourage a plaintiffs’ lawyer to sue.156 
There are, however, a number of counterarguments against public 
enforcement.  One downside of an enhanced SEC role is that it relies on the 
state to determine the optimal level of deterrence.  While the state is 
superior to the market in making deterrence calculations when significant 
externalities are present, the SEC might regulate too aggressively in a 
world without private rights of action, i.e., it would terrorize corporations 
and interfere in common business operations.157  To some extent, this 
possibility is simply a risk worth taking.  The system already over-deters 
firms, and the SEC’s incentives would be better aligned at least to 
prosecute fraud rather than to extract settlements.  Additionally, while 
courts generally defer to the SEC’s investigatory powers, this deference has 
not been absolute.  For example, in SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel 
Corp.,158 the court second-guessed an SEC investigation when the 
investigation was clearly politically motivated.159 
A second counterargument is that SEC penalties are too insignificant 
to deter large corporations or compensate investors.  One might imagine, 
however, that the government would increase penalties for securities fraud 
in a world without private enforcement.  Indeed, shareholders likely would 
Cir. 1973) (emphasizing the SEC’s freedom to conduct investigations). 
 155.  See NAGY ET AL., supra note 66, at 642–47, 673–74 (discussing tools at the SEC's 
disposal to conduct effective investigations).  Sarbanes Oxley also authorizes the SEC to 
pursue court-ordered temporary asset freezes to prevent suspect corporations from 
distributing remaining assets to shareholders or officers.  See id. at 674 (explaining that the 
purpose of the asset freeze is to prevent “extraordinary payments” to directors, officers, 
agents or employees).  For a discussion of available remedies, see id. at 675–78 
(summarizing the statutory authority that grants both administrative and judicial relief to the 
SEC). 
 156.  Id. at 636–37; Cox & Thomas, supra note 153, at 743–44; see Howell E. Jackson 
& Mark J. Roe, Public Enforcement of Securities Laws:  Preliminary Evidence (July 25, 
2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Harvard Law Sch. Eur. Corp. Governance 
Inst.), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1003177 (discussing the strengths of public 
regulation relative to private regulation in an international context). 
 157.  This fear relates to the nirvana fallacy, or the tendency to ignore the shortcomings 
of governmental intervention.  Cf. Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency:  Another 
Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2–4 (1969). 
 158.  648 F.2d 118 (3d Cir. 1981). 
 159.  See id.  This case, however, was an “exceptional decision” and clearly a minority 
outcome.  NAGY ET AL., supra note 66, at 640. 
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lobby for such reforms if they were necessary for optimal deterrence.  
Additionally, although the compensatory value of securities class actions 
admittedly is greater than that of SEC enforcement, such value is of little 
necessity and further of little practical value.  According to the National 
Economic Research Associates (NERA), the average size of settlements 
increased from $17.6 million, when measured from 1996 through 2001, to 
$40.2 million from 2002 through 2007.160  Median investor losses also 
increased quite dramatically in the past decade, from $66 million in 1996, 
to $333, $407, and $310 million in 2005, 2006, and 2007, respectively.161  
In line with these trends, the ratio of settlements to median investor losses 
attributable to declines in stock price declined from 7.2% in 1996, to 3.4% 
in 2001, and 3.1%, 2.1%, and 2.4% in 2005, 2006, and 2007, 
respectively.162  Given that these numbers reflect a relatively diminutive 
value and do not account for “plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and expenses, 
defense counsels’ fees and expenses, Directors’ and Officers’ (D&O) 
insurance premiums, and the possible costs of disruption, stigma, and 
adverse publicity,”163 Professor John Coffee speculates that “it is an open 
question as to whether the typical securities class action settlement actually 
produces any net recovery, particularly to diversified shareholders.”164  
Further support for this conclusion is that institutional investors frequently 
fail to file claims.165 
 160.  NERA, supra note 108, at 1.  These values include “mega-settlements” of over $1 
billion, which tend to be outliers, but have occurred with greater frequency in recent years.  
Excluding these values, the averages drop to $11.5 million from 1996 through 2001, and 
$24.4 million from 2002 through 2007.  Id. 
 161.  Id. at 14–15.  Although the seemingly low size of settlements in relation to median 
investor losses suggests that the current system under-deters, this is not necessarily the 
case.  Settlements do not account for other impacts on businesses, such as costs of litigation 
and damage to reputation.  As Part I.A discusses supra, the actual “damages” in these cases 
is zero given that a seller gains for every buyer that loses, and vice-versa.  Thus, the ratio 
of average settlements to median investor losses is an inappropriate anchor with which to 
gauge deterrence. 
 162.  NERA, supra note 108, at 14.  NERA, however, likely underestimates these ratios 
substantially.  Because it defines “investor losses” based merely on stock price declines, it 
includes losses from various non-fraud-related factors, such as industry-wide problems.  
See Coffee, supra note 6, at 1545 (exploring options to impose penalties of securities class 
actions on truly culpable parties). 
 163.  Coffee, supra note 6, at 1546. 
 164.  Id. at 1547. 
 165.  See Choi, supra note 6, at 1503 (discussing the American experience of securities 
private class actions).  See generally James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions 
Slip Through Your Fingers:  Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of 
Financial Institutions To Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. 
REV. 411, 413 (2005) (discussing the results of an extensive investigation about the 
frequency with which financial institutions submit claims in settled securities class actions); 
James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table:  Do Institutional 
Investors Fail to File Claims in Securities Class Action?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855, 855–65 
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B.  Pre-Commitment Strategies 
The high degree of uncertainty regarding the necessary level of 
deterrence suggests that securities laws should give shareholders greater 
freedom to contract.  Based on this rationale, an alternative system would 
allow shareholders to commit themselves to binding arbitration clauses and 
thus waive their ability to bring class actions (i.e., collective action 
waivers).  Such reform might be possible without SEC or Congressional 
action; shareholders might simply vote to amend their corporate charter to 
include such a waiver.166  Other contexts, such as credit card contracts,167 
frequently use similar arbitration clauses, and Professor Myriam Gilles 
notes that current waivers are “not a distant leap from a doctrine holding 
that a collective action waiver ‘travels with the stock,’ as part of the basket 
of rights purchased by the shareholder in the open market when he 
purchases a company’s common stock.”168  Although shareholders lack a 
clear, easily-modifiable contractual relationship with the corporation in 
which they hold stock, “[a]ll that really matters to the court is that the 
consumer acts (or refrains from acting) while on notice that the terms and 
conditions established by the [company] include arbitration.”169  Professor 
Gilles speculates that such notice might easily be provided by, for example, 
a legend on the security that indicates the class action waiver, actual notice 
from brokers, a NASDAQ website, or constructive notice from 
amendments to the corporate charter itself.170 
Still, such waivers would face two substantial legal obstacles.  First, 
some jurisdictions, such as California171 and the Eleventh Circuit172 in 
(2002) (examining whether financial institutions fail to submit claims for their losses in 
settled securities class actions).  But see Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, The 
Pentium Papers:  A Case Study of Collective Institutional Investor Activism in Litigation, 
38 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 561 (1996) (noting that institutional investors participate in 
securities litigation, although their participation is informal). 
 166.  Although shareholders as a whole cannot organize effectively to coordinate their 
positions on securities litigation, coordination on a smaller scale—such as between 
shareholders of only one corporation—is possible. 
 167.  See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability:  The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise 
of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 396–97 (2005) (noting the inclusion 
of collective action waivers in small-merchant contracts by American Express).  In August 
2005, shareholders actually filed a class action against several major U.S. credit card-
issuing banks and alleged that the defendants secretly and collusively met to impose class 
action waivers.  Id. at 398–99. 
 168.  Id. at 425. 
 169.  Id. at 423. 
 170.  Id. at 424. 
 171.  See, e.g., Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1109 (Cal. 2005) 
(holding collective actions waivers unconscionable where the dispute involved minimal 
damages and the party with superior bargaining power cheated consumers out of small 
individual sums of money); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 864 (Cal. Ct. 
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particular, have held collective actions waivers unconscionable under 
certain circumstances.  Unconscionability, however, is a fact-specific 
inquiry, and most of these adverse cases are distinguishable from the 
present situation.  Most importantly, cases that find unconscionability 
usually involve consumer contracts, which unlike shares, are adhesive in 
nature.173  Individuals who purchase shares are more likely sophisticated 
and less likely to need judicial protection; securities simply involve a lesser 
risk of exploitation.  Affected individuals have alternate options in which to 
invest,174 and regardless, the vast majority of courts generally reject 
unconscionability claims even in the more sympathetic context of 
consumer contracts.175 
The second potential obstacle is that such arbitration may be 
inconsistent with shareholders’ statutory rights under the 1933 and 1934 
Acts, and the SEC’s related policy against arbitration of such shareholder 
disputes.176  Yet, courts may conclude that collective action waivers in the 
context of arbitration are enforceable.  As the Supreme Court has often 
noted, the Federal Arbitration Act177 establishes a strong presumption that 
arbitration agreements are enforceable,178 and, in this context, the court is 
App. 2002) (holding credit card company’s provision against class actions procedurally and 
substantively unconscionable). 
 172.  See, e.g., Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding 
arbitration agreement between provider and subscribers precluding class actions 
substantively unconscionable). 
 173.  See Lindsay R. Androski, A Contested Merger:  The Intersection of Class Actions 
and Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 631, 654–60 (2005) 
(exploring situations where plaintiffs seek lawsuits despite a mandatory arbitration clause in 
their contracts). 
 174.  Cf. id. at 655 (arguing that freedom of contract allows parties to determine 
whether a given investment is favorable to them, and if not, to decline the 
transaction). 
 175.  See Gilles, supra note 167, at 140–47 (summarizing the two waves of 
unconscionability claims); Hans Smit, Class Actions and Their Waiver in Arbitration, 15 
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 199, 202–03 (2004) (examining the prospects of class action 
arbitrations); J. Maria Glover, Note, Beyond Unconscionability:  Class Action Waivers and 
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1735, 1737, 1751–53 (2006) 
(urging a re-examination of class action waivers); see also Richard A. Nagareda, 
Aggregation and its Discontents:  Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration, and 
CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1898–1902 (2006) (examining the distortion effect that a 
decision to afford or withhold aggregate treatment may have on the underlying substantive 
law and remedial scheme). 
 176.  See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (“Even 
claims arising under a statute designed to further important social policies may be 
arbitrated because ‘so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] 
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum,’ the statute serves its functions.” (quoting 
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991))). 
 177.  Codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2000) (amended 2002). 
 178.  See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) (“The 
preeminent concern of Congress in passing the Act was to enforce private agreements into 
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likely to find that arbitration itself does not alter substantive rights.  Indeed, 
both arbitration and class actions solely are procedural devices:  “By 
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the 
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution 
in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”179 
Accordingly, courts have upheld waivers of a number of procedural 
rights, from the right to a jury trial180 to the right to punitive damages.181  
Following this reasoning, a number of courts have held that “[a]rbitration 
clauses are not unenforceable simply because they might render a class 
action unavailable.”182  Further, although the Court found that the inability 
to bring a claim because of high legal fees rendered an arbitration clause 
illegal in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph,183 
corporations can resolve this concern easily if they offer to reimburse 
successful plaintiffs’ arbitration fees when claims are below a certain 
amount. 
Agreements to binding arbitration are only second-best solutions to 
the coordination problems that accompany securities class actions.  Such 
agreements represent commitment strategies to reduce the cost of defecting 
rather than commitments to cooperate.  Arbitration still would allow 
awards of compensatory damages when such transfers reduce net value for 
shareholders.  But, arbitration at least would reduce transaction costs 
substantially, especially where the form of the agreement under 
which parties had entered, and that concern requires that we rigorously enforce agreements 
to arbitrate, even if the result is ‘piecemeal’ litigation.”); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. 
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983) (“The Arbitration Act establishes that, as 
a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be 
resolved in favor of arbitration.”). 
 179.  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).  
See Androski, supra note 173, at 636 (exploring Mitsubishi Motors Corp.); Nagareda, 
supra note 175, at 1897 (“[N]either an arbitration clause in a private contract nor a class 
action in a court is supposed to have the capacity, in itself, to alter substantive rights 
conferred by legislation.”). 
 180.  See Deborah Matties, A Case for Judicial Self-Restraint in Interpreting 
Contractual Jury Trial Waivers in Federal Court, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 431 (1997) 
(discussing the waiver of the right to trial by jury). 
 181.  See Smit, supra note 175, at 200 (highlighting contractual provisions that deny 
arbitrators the right to award punitive damages). 
 182.  Rains v. Found. Health Sys. Life & Health, 23 P.3d 1249, 1253 (Colo. Ct. App. 
2001).  See Androski, supra note 173, at 638 (“A plaintiff’s right to litigate class action 
claims is waivable, even when that procedural right is expressly provided by statute.”). 
 183.  531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000).  The Fourth Circuit defined the relevant inquiry for 
arbitration as follows:  The appropriate inquiry is one that evaluates whether the arbitral 
forum in a particular case is an adequate and accessible substitute to litigation, i.e., a case-
by-case analysis that focuses, among other things, upon . . . the expected cost differential 
between arbitration and litigation in court, and whether that cost differential is so 
substantial as to deter the bringing of claims.  Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., 
Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 (4th Cir. 2001). 
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consideration would waive collective action.184  Most importantly, 
arbitration would limit the potential damages in any given case such that 
corporations would not experience the same in terrorem pressure to 
settle.185  As a result, shareholders no longer would have incentives to bring 
non-meritorious litigation.  While the aforementioned coordination 
problems still might encourage arbitration of claims where there should be 
none, arbitration would at least lower the costs of the dilemma 
substantially. 
 CONCLUSION 
The rationales for securities class actions are questionable at best.  
Securities litigation merely redistributes wealth among innocent 
shareholders and fails to penalize the most culpable parties.  Shareholders 
lose value as a whole because litigation reduces the prices of their shares 
and transfers a large amount of their wealth to lawyers.  So why would 
rational, diversified shareholders continue to bring these suits?  This 
Comment has attempted to answer this fundamental question by showing 
that coordination problems and the prisoners’ dilemma in particular 
underlie and explain the frequency of 10b-5 class actions.  Instead of 
simply trying to screen out “frivolous” litigation, the Court should consider 
broader, more radical solutions to respond to this dilemma.  For example, 
the Court might eliminate the private right of action altogether or find ways 
to substantially reduce transaction costs to minimize the costs of the 
prisoners’ dilemma. 
 APPENDIX I:  TWO-PERSON PRISONERS’ DILEMMA 
This appendix presents and explains the two-person prisoners’ 
dilemma model algebraically.  The fully diversified model functions as 
follows:  Assume that two groups of investors, A and B, own all of the 
shares (m total) of two companies, X and Y.  At point one, each company 
releases fraudulent earnings estimates that cause their stock prices to 
increase from P1 to P2.  At point two, A sells n shares of X to B, and B sells 
 184.  Such an agreement might need to prohibit class-wide arbitration explicitly to avoid 
creating the same problem under a different name.  For a discussion of the problems with 
class arbitration, see Androski, supra note 173, at 645–46 (citing problems such as 
incomplete records, lack of legal explanations, and the difficulty to successfully challenge 
the arbitrator’s decision). 
 185.  See id. at 656 (noting that a large corporate defendant in the private arbitration 
setting “would feel less pressure to settle unnecessarily, as there is no risk of the negative 
media attention incurred through public access to proceedings and to official court records.  
Moreover, the substitution of a neutral arbitrator for a potentially hyper-sympathetic jury 
may reduce the risk of excessive damages awards”). 
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the same number of shares of Y to A.  At point three, X and Y release 
corrective disclosures, which cause the price of their stocks to lose the 
inflation that the earlier misrepresentation caused. 
Now, A and B each have a legally cognizable 10b-5 claim, and, 
should they decide to sue, both may recover an amount equal to their 
damages discounted by legal fees.  Their damages will equal the difference 
between the inflated price and the actual, non-inflated price (P2–P1) 
multiplied by the number of affected shares (n).  This amount also must be 
discounted by attorneys’ fees equal to c% of the damages.  Accordingly, 
the total recovery is:  (1-c)((n)(P2–P1)). 
Assuming that the market is efficient, one can expect the price of the 
shares to impound information related to the lawsuit.  For example, if both 
parties choose to sue, then the price per share will decline in anticipation of 
suit-related losses.  One may model this as a decline in price from P1 to P3.  
Thus, the magnitude of the decline is measurable and equals the pro rata 
drop in market capitalization, or, in other terms, the amount of damages for 
which each share theoretically would be responsible:  (1/m)((n)(P2–P1)).  In 
reality, this is a severe underestimate that does not account for the costs of 
business disruption or even the company’s own attorneys’ fees.  But, this 
does not change the outcome, and accounting for such expenses would only 
worsen the dilemma.  If A or B chooses not to sue, however, we anticipate 
that the market would impound this information as well, and thus the price 
of the stock would return to P1, its original price. 
For simplicity’s sake, this model will continue with a slight change in 
terminology, given that the diversification assumption makes A and B’s 
positions interchangeable.  There are four possible positions which either A 
or B can hold: 
1.  Victims Filing Suit (Plaintiffs).  Victims who file suit end up with 
the aforementioned damage award of (1-c)((n)((P2–P1)), plus the value of 
their shares, nP1, which we assume the plaintiff retains.  If one alters this 
assumption such that the plaintiff sells its shares to the opposite party, the 
opposite party’s shares would increase from (m–n) to (m), which 
counteracts the effect of the sale and does not change the result. 
2.  Victims Not Filing Suit.  Victims who do not file suit will have only 
nP3, or the value of their remaining shares. 
3.  Non-Plaintiff Shareholder in a Company Subject to Suit.  If, for 
example, Y’s misrepresentation damages A and A sues, then B would be a 
non-plaintiff shareholder in a company (Y) subject to suit.  In that situation, 
B would have (m–n) shares, but at a lower price that reflects the lost value 
to the firm from the lawsuit (n(P2–P1)).  Accordingly, the total value would 
be:  P1(m–n)–(n(P2–P1)). 
4.  Non-Plaintiff Shareholder in a Company Not Being Sued.  If, for 
example, X’s misrepresentation damages B, but B chooses not to sue, then 
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A will be a non-plaintiff shareholder in a company (X) that is not being 
sued.  In such a situation, A would retain the value of its shares at the initial 
price, P1(m–n). 
*          *          *          * 
The following tables summarize the variables and these results: 
 
TABLE 1:  VARIABLES 
Variable Description 
M The total number of shares in companies X and Y 
N The number of shares purchased by A and B (and sold by the 
opposite)  
P1 The original price, P1 < P2 
P2 Price after being inflated by a misrepresentation 
P3 Price after a corrective disclosure, impounding the anticipated 
verdict, P1, P2 > P3 
C The percentage contingency fee paid to plaintiffs’ lawyers. 1 
≥ c ≥ 0 
 
 
TABLE 2:  INDIVIDUAL OUTCOMES 
Party Recovery 
Victim, Filing Suit (Plaintiff) nP1–((n/m)((n)(P2–P1))) + (1-
c)((n)(P2–P1)), or, simplified, nP3 + 
(1-c)((n)(P2–P1)) 
Victim not Filing Suit nP3 
Non-Plaintiff Shareholder in a Sued 
Company 
P1(m–n)–((m–n)/m)(P2–P1)), or, 
simplified, P3(m–n) 
Non-Plaintiff Shareholder without 
Suit 
P1(m–n) 
 
 
TABLE 3:  THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA 
 B Sues B Does Not Sue 
A Sues (mP3+((1-c)((n)(P2–P1))), 
((mP3+(1-c)((n)(P2–P1)))   
(nP3+(1-c)((n)(P2–P1))+P1(m–
n)), (nP1 + P3(m–n)) 
A Does 
Not Sue 
(nP1+P3(m–n)), (nP3+(1-c) 
((n)(P2–P1))+P1(m–n)) 
(mP1, mP1) 
 
Although difficult to see without the aid of numbers, algebra reflects 
the dilemma.  For a prisoners’ dilemma to hold, T > R > P > S, where:  T is 
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the temptation to defect, that is, the payoff for defecting when the opposite 
player cooperates; R is the reward for cooperating, mP1 in this example; P 
is the payout when both players defect; and S is the payout for suckers 
(those who cooperate when their opposing players defect).186 
Table 4 displays the values of these variables: 
 
TABLE 4:  PAYOUTS 
Party Payout 
T nP3 + ((1-c)((n)(P2–P1)) + P1(m–n) 
R mP1 
P ((mP3 + (1-c)((n)(P2–P1)) 
S nP1 + P3(m–n) 
 
Two critical variables are the recovery that a suit generates and the 
additional losses from the price declines that the suit triggers.  The value of 
these two costs are ((1-c)(n)(P2–P1)) and ((n/m)((n)(P2–P1))), respectively.  
Here, T is greater than R assuming that the recovery from suing, ((1-
c)(n)(P2–P1)), is greater than the value lost from holding sued shares, or 
(n)(P1–P3).  This necessarily is true because courts likely include the latter 
value in the former.  R is greater than P if m(P1–P3) is greater than the 
recovery from suit, ((1-c)(n)(P2–P1)).  This is also true because m(P1–P3), 
by definition, equals n(P2–P1).  Because both values proxy the value of the 
lawsuit to the corporation, the former value is the same as the latter, except 
that it is not discounted by (1-c).  Finally, P is greater than S if the recovery 
from suit, ((1-c)(n)(P2–P1)), is greater than n(P1–P3), which represents the 
damage from sued shares.  This also is true because the former value 
includes the latter. 
Analytically speaking, these conclusions make sense:  A party is best 
off if he or she can recover through securities class actions when his or her 
shares are damaged, but not pay the costs associated with such suits as an 
unaffected shareholder in a sued company.  The next best option is to never 
sue.  This way, a party does not incur any transaction fees.  The third-best 
option is to sue and be sued, which characterizes the current legal 
environment.  This is inferior to cooperation, however, because such 
shareholders will have to pay the transaction fees for others’ suits, and will 
recover only as much as they lose because of diversification.  Finally, the 
worst case scenario is to pay others’ transaction fees, but never to recover 
for one’s own damages. 
A more realistic model for the aforementioned situation, however, 
mightbe the n-person prisoners’ dilemma.  This model defines algebraically 
the value of cooperation and defection for an unlimited number of persons, 
 
 186. AXELROD, supra note 144, at 206. 
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which allows one to apply this model to diversified shareholders who want 
to decide whether to participate in a securities class action. 
The model defines “cooperation” as choosing to forgo litigation, and 
“defection” as filing such litigation.  The model then sets the utilities 
associated with these two choices as follows:  C(x) is the utility of those 
who cooperate, and D(x) is the utility of those who defect if x people 
cooperate.  These variables relate such that when cooperation is less than 
universal—that is when k, a number fewer than N, people cooperate—the 
individual payoff of defecting will still be greater than cooperating.  This is 
expressed as D(k–1)> C(k), where 1≤ k ≤ N.  Additionally, universal 
cooperation pays everyone more than universal non-cooperation:  D(0) < 
C(N).187  Accordingly, gain (g) equals “the added benefit to each 
participant for universal cooperation over universal noncooperation.”188  
The model describes temptation as “the incentive for each individual not to 
cooperate,” and defines temptation as t = D(k-1)–C(k), where 1 ≤ k ≤ N.189  
Thus, cooperation increases as g increases and as t decreas 190
The n-person model relies on four central assumptions:  (1) each of 
the N persons must choose between cooperation or defection; (2) the 
payoffs for both choices increase monotonically with the proportion of 
people who cooperate; (3) the defect choice always yields a more highly 
valued individual outcome than the cooperate choice; and (4) the outcome 
is higher if everyone chooses to cooperate than if everyone chooses to 
defect.191 
Thinking of securities litigation along these four lines helps illustrate 
the problem.  The securities litigation context would define cooperation as 
choosing not to bring a suit and defecting as bringing suit.  Shareholders 
generally face these two choices; even if another party brings a class action, 
shareholders can still preserve their ability to “cooperate” if they opt out of 
the class.  For example, the Supreme Court has noted that “due process 
require[s] that [a class] member ‘receive notice plus an opportunity to be 
heard and participate in the litigation,’ and . . . ‘at a minimum . . . an absent 
plaintiff [must] be provided with an opportunity to remove himself from 
the class.’”192  Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that 
 187. See Phillip Bonachich et al., Cooperation and Group Size in the N-Person 
Prisoners’ Dilemma, 20 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 687, 689 (1976) (explaining that non-
cooperation creates a deficient equilibrium). 
 188. Id., or g = C(N)–D(0). 
 189. Id. 
 190. See id. at 690 (showing the results of higher cooperation). 
 191. Samuel S. Komorita, A Model of the N-Person Dilemma-Type Game, 12 J. EXPER. 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 357, 358 (1976); see Block-Lieb, supra note 147, at 811–15 (describing the 
differences between two-person and n-person prisoners’ dilemmas). 
 192. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 848 (1999) (quoting Phillips Petroleum 
Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985)).  See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The 
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notice be given in “a reasonable manner to all class members who would be 
bound by the proposal.”193 
The second through fourth conditions also apply to securities 
litigation.  As greater numbers of people cooperate, the payouts to both 
choices increase because people spend fewer resources on transaction costs 
such as legal fees.  Moreover, while each player can earn more by defecting 
(any given shareholder’s dominant strategy would be to file a class action 
and hope that others failed to do the same), shareholders would likely be 
better off overall if none of them chose to sue.  This assumes, however, that 
there were no irresolvable under-deterrence problems.  Again, this 
reasoning predicts that the amount of litigation will be too high, and 
perhaps represents a number of strike suits. 
Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation:  Theoretical and Empirical 
Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1534–36 (discussing the basis of class members’ opt-out 
abilities). 
 193. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1). 
